



# CoST Country Study: Vietnam





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## Executive Summary

CoST is a public infrastructure transparency and accountability initiative. As a multi-stakeholder initiative, CoST works with government, industry and civil society to support the routine disclosure of public infrastructure project information into the public domain. This information is subjected to regular 'spot checks' to assess the accuracy of information disclosed, compliance with transparency requirements and performance or progress of the project. Discrepancies are highlighted in simple language that is easy for citizens to understand and which they can use to demand improvements in public infrastructure procurement and delivery<sup>1</sup>. Vietnam participated in the CoST pilot programme from 2008 to 2011. Since then, several attempts have been made to continue the momentum of CoST but at this point, the Vietnam programme is largely dormant.

In partnership with the UK Government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), CoST is conducting four country studies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam to assess the applicability and viability of the initiative in each country.

The purpose of this study is to understand the:

- Key characteristics of public infrastructure investment and governance in Vietnam;
- Public infrastructure transparency policy and practice (baseline) in Vietnam; and
- Scope for improving public infrastructure transparency and accountability, specifically the CoST value-add and potential challenges/barriers to implementation, in Vietnam.

In the last 30 years, Vietnam has emerged sovereign and prosperous from a millennium of domination and turbulence. Now, a Lower-middle Income Country (World Bank 2016a), growth rates have consistently been ahead of Southeast Asia and world growth averages. This has resulted in a reduction in Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 3.4% in 2005 to 2.4% of Gross National Income in 2014<sup>5</sup> (World Bank, 2016b) and an increase in FDI (GSO, 2016).

### *Public Infrastructure Investment and Delivery*

The country's topography results in a great dependency on roads, air and rail infrastructure. In addition, Vietnam's growing and aging population is increasing pressures on public infrastructure. Up to US\$500 billion in investment is required to meet infrastructure needs between 2014 to 2024. According to the Vietnam Leadership, the US\$300 billion infrastructure spending gap for this period has to be plugged by private sector investment. Given the reductions in ODA, attracting FDI is also a top priority for Vietnam. This means that CoST has a key role to play; greater transparency and accountability in public infrastructure investments helps to deliver value for money and greater efficiency in spending.

In terms of infrastructure quality, Vietnam is ranked in the bottom half of countries globally on its overall infrastructure quality and performs significantly worse than other countries on road quality. This is especially concerning given that road transport is the second most important freight type in Vietnam. It is encouraging to note that the Vietnam Leadership's infrastructure investment priorities reflect infrastructure needs; of the Ministries with the largest proportion of infrastructure investment, the Ministry of Transport spent the most in 2015.

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<sup>1</sup> For more information, please refer to the CoST [Factsheet](#) and Infrastructure Data Standard.

Public infrastructure procurement in Vietnam is extremely complex; there are thousands of procuring entities (PEs) at the central, provincial and municipal levels. Any of these PEs could be a project owner or manage public infrastructure projects. The situation is further inflated by the existence of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) which operate as private enterprises but with 100% state ownership. With assets equivalent to 80% of Vietnam's GDP (Vietnam News, 2015a), these SOEs are known to be poorly managed and highly inefficient. In relation to the private sector, the top 100 construction companies' assets amounted to US\$7 billion in 2016, and grew 12.4% from 2015-2016 (Soha News, 2016), almost double Vietnam's GDP growth of 6.7%. The industry is dominated by five firms which account for 50% of industry revenue, and there is a common perception that construction firms are closely linked to government, and benefit from 'special relationships'. CoST can help streamline processes and reduce mismanagement and inefficiency. In addition, greater transparency and accountability help to create level playing fields and fairer competition.

### *Governance*

Vietnam is a one party state with highly centralized decision-making processes and significant administrative bureaucracy. Decrees and Decisions are passed all the way down from the highest level to the neighbourhood-level. At each level, legislation is localised to suit the local context which can result in subtle variations in legislation and procedures from neighbourhood-to-neighbourhood, and significant variations between districts and provinces. The size of the civil service is also extremely large and wages are low which create incentives for bribery and petty corruption.

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) consistently ranks Vietnam as one of the most corrupt countries on the world, ranking it 112<sup>th</sup> out of 168 countries. In 2014, the World Bank conducted a corruption perceptions survey which found that citizens, businesses, and government all contribute to a vicious cycle of corruption. Although various anti-corruption efforts have been initiated, these efforts have proven to be largely ineffective. Vietnam's overall governance environment is poorer than its neighboring countries; this is reflected in Vietnam's World Bank Governance score, as well as all of the subcomponents.

With regards to press freedom, Freedom House (2015a and 2015b) concludes that the Vietnamese press and Internet are 'not free', citing numerous cases of harassment and arrests. Most media outlets are owned by the CPV (Freedom House, 2015a). Furthermore, Freedom House argues that the CPV "generally views the media as a tool for the promotion of party and state policy, and authorities often intervene directly to either place or censor content." The same applies for censorship on the Internet.

CoST also has a role to play in improving Vietnam's poor governance performance and previously ineffective anti-corruption measures. The limitations on freedoms of speech and press also provide strong reasons for CoST implementation, specifically in relation to capacity building for civil society and media.

### *Transparency: Policy and Practice*

There is an existing framework for transparency in Vietnam: at the international level Vietnam has signed up to initiatives including CoST and Open Contracting Partnership (OCP), whilst at the national level there are approximately 10 laws relating to information disclosure. In relation to the CoST IDS, current national disclosure requirements only demand 23 of the 40 (57.5%) CoST IDS data points to be disclosed routinely (without citizen request). Vietnam's first Access to Information Law (AIL) will come into force in July 2018 which may increase disclosure requirements but at the time of writing there is insufficient information available to accurately assess its impact.

Compliance with transparency requirements was assessed based on a random sample of 20 projects drawn from the top five Ministries in terms of proportion of infrastructure investment. At the project level, the average compliance rate with legal requirements is 39% whilst the compliance rate with the CoST IDS is 32%. The best performing Ministry was the Ministry of Transport (MOT) with 53% compliance with legal requirements and 40% compliance with the CoST IDS. This is important because the MOT is responsible for the largest portion of development investment. The Ministry of Health (MOH) was least compliant, with an average compliance rate of just 11% with legal requirements and 6% with the CoST IDS.

Given their strategic importance and investment value, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in Vietnam recommended that an additional six flagship projects were included in this assessment. Of these six, two were at very early stages so an assessment of compliance was not applicable. In terms of the four remaining projects, disclosure compliance was better than that of the abovementioned 20 sample projects by at least ten percentage points. However, this is likely due to the variation in the methodology of data collection. The information on the 20 projects was derived from a single source (PE/PMU websites), whereas the information on these four flagship projects was drawn from multiple sources. Furthermore, the size and prominence of these projects in public discourse increased the likelihood of information being actively disclosed into the public domain.

Although an eProcurement Portal is under development, there is currently no single source where citizens can access information across all project lifecycles. Generally, information is disclosed on individual Ministry websites in an ad hoc manner. A common weakness across all Ministry websites is poor usability both in terms of functionality and presentation; it is difficult for citizens to access or find information and in addition vital information is often missing. A key requirement of transparency is accessibility and information, even if published, is useless if the average citizen cannot locate it.

Given the low levels of transparency requirements and compliance in Vietnam, the Leadership would benefit significantly from CoST best practice, guidance and practical implementation tools for improving transparency and accountability in public infrastructure.

### *Recommendations*

Chapter 7 outlines 12 key recommendations for CoST implementation in Vietnam. The centralized nature of government in Vietnam necessitates the explicit endorsement of the Vietnam Leadership at the highest political levels. Without this, CoST will be slow to progress and unlikely to be institutionalized across PEs. The size, scale and complexity of government and PEs also demands that CoST is broad enough in scope and flexible in its adaptation so as to ensure applicability not only at the central government level but also at the provincial and municipal levels. Capacity building activities for PEs are vital to improving disclosure compliance.

Strategic partnerships with key stakeholders across government, industry and civil society are vital; CoST must leverage existing relationships, initiatives or mechanisms that have already gained traction on the ground to advance the infrastructure transparency agenda. CoST should actively support the development of tools and technologies that enable effective information disclosure. However, information that is published but not used is useless. Therefore, disclosure must be supplemented by targeted capacity building programmes aimed at training civil society, media and citizens to use the information in a constructive way.

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# Acronyms

ACL	Anti-Corruption Law of 2005
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFD	Agence Francaise de Developpment
AIL	Access to Information Law of 2016
APAC	Asian and Pacific
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BOT	Build, Operate Transfer
BT	Build and Transfer
BTO	Build, Transfer, Operate
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIENCO 6	Civil Engineering Construction Corporation No. 6
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CPV	Communist Party of Vietnam
DFID	Department for International Development
DOET	Department of Education and Training
EIB	European Investment Bank
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EVN	Vietnam Electricity Holding Company
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIA	Foreign Investment Agency, MPI
GCR	Global Competitiveness Report
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSO	General Statistics Office of Vietnam
HCM	Ho Chi Minh City
HURM	Hanoi Urban Railway Management
IDS	Infrastructure Data Standard
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
KfW	German Development Bank
KOICA	Korean International Cooperation Agency
LR	Legal requirement
MARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MAUR	Ho Chi Minh City Urban Railway Management Authority
MOC	Ministry of Construction
MOET	Ministry of Education and Training
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOIC	Ministry of Information and Communications
MOIT	Ministry of Industry and Trade
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MNRE	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
MPI	Ministry of Planning and Investment
MOT	Ministry of Transport
NA	National Assembly, Communist Party of Vietnam
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCDS	Open Contracting Data Standard
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OCP	Open Contracting Partnership
OGP	Open Government Partnership
OSCAC	Office of the Steering Committee on Anti-corruption
PMU	Project Management Unit
PPA	Public Purchasing Authority
PE	Procuring Entity
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PM	Prime Minister of Vietnam
PO	Project Owner
PV	Petro Vietnam Oil and Gas Company
PVC	Petro Vietnam Construction Company
RTI	Right to Information Legislation

SEA	Southeast Asia
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
TI	Transparency International
TPP	Transpacific Partnership Trade Agreement
TT	Towards Transparency
U4	Utstein Partnership
VACC	Vietnamese Association of Construction Contractors
VCCI	Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry
VNRA	Vietnam Railway Authority
WEF	World Economic Forum
WSJ	Wall Street Journal

# Introduction

## CoST

CoST is a public infrastructure transparency and accountability initiative. As a multi-stakeholder initiative, CoST works with government, industry and civil society to support the routine disclosure of public infrastructure project information into the public domain. This information is subjected to regular 'spot checks' to assess the accuracy of information disclosed, compliance with transparency requirements and performance or progress of the project. Discrepancies are highlighted in simple language that is easy for citizens to understand and which they can use to demand improvements in public infrastructure procurement and delivery<sup>2</sup>.

Vietnam participated in the CoST pilot programme from 2008 to 2011. Ten Procuring Entities (PEs) compiled and disclosed project information using a variety of media including websites, sector and local newspapers, radio, and offices of project owners and local government. The projects spanned vital infrastructure including roads, water supply, drainage and sanitation and ports. This process was led by a highly competent CoST Vietnam Country Manager.

Following the pilot programme, CoST Vietnam received funding from the UK government's Department for International Development (DFID) Vietnam office for an eight-month Bridging Phase which enabled continued disclosure on nine sample projects. In April 2013, the Ministry of Construction (MoC) submitted a Roll-Out Plan (RoP) to DFID and World Bank Vietnam to scale up CoST Vietnam. Approximately 24 PEs from five sector ministries and 15 provinces across Vietnam, encompassing 50 projects and 150 contract packages, were included in the RoP. The RoP phase was scheduled to begin in 2014 and continue for three years. However, due to changes in personnel, the lack of financing and absence of high-level political commitment, the RoP was not implemented.

CoST International continues to work with various local stakeholders and maintains ongoing dialogue with the MoC and other government representatives to drive forward the agenda for infrastructure transparency in Vietnam.

## Background to the Vietnam Study

Southeast Asia (SEA) infrastructure investment has risen sharply in recent years to remedy historical underinvestment and accommodate the explosion in demand (McKinsey and Company, 2011). The biggest demand is expected in transport and energy, "the sectors most critical to supporting heightened economic activity". Public infrastructure investment must be managed through good governance.

Therefore, CoST is conducting four country studies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam to determine the current level of public infrastructure transparency and accountability nationally. These studies will feed into an overall SEA regional study, and assess the extent to which CoST can add value.

The project is funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), UK Government, through the Southeast Asia Prosperity Fund.

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<sup>2</sup> For more information, please refer to the CoST [Factsheet](#) and Infrastructure Data Standard.

## Objectives of the Vietnam Study

The purpose of this study is to understand the:

- Key characteristics of public infrastructure investment and governance in Vietnam;
- Public infrastructure transparency policy and practice (baseline) in Vietnam; and
- Scope for improving public infrastructure transparency and accountability, specifically the CoST value-add and potential challenges/barriers to implementation, in Vietnam.

## Scope and Structure of this Study

The Vietnam study is based on a comprehensive literature review, in addition to primary and secondary data to determine the transparency baseline. Conclusions and recommendations have been drawn from the findings to highlight the value add of CoST. More information on the research approach, limitations, and assumptions can be found in the Methodology section.

This study begins with some key information about the Vietnamese economy to set the context and is followed by an overview of public infrastructure investment and delivery in Vietnam. Subsequent sections discuss governance and transparency – both policy and practice in public infrastructure - in Vietnam. Throughout the study, key enablers and barriers will be assessed to identify whether CoST has a role in Vietnam. Recommendations on this will be presented in the conclusion.

# Methodology

## Key Definitions

*Public infrastructure* is defined as infrastructure that is either owned by the public or is for public use, with the exception of defence and public security. The reason for this exception is that they relate to national security and are not subject to the same standards of disclosure as other public infrastructure.

*Disclosure* refers to the publication of information relating to public infrastructure projects into the public domain. *Proactive disclosure* is when information is published routinely as a matter of course without any request for information having been made. *Reactive disclosure* is when information is provided in response to a request for information.

*Foreign direct investment (FDI)* includes any investment from outside Vietnam excluding bilateral and multilateral official development assistance (ODA).

*Informal payments* represent all exchanges of money or gifts that are not required by contract or law. They include bribes that are given in order to influence a decision in the bribe giver's favour and unwritten payments that are expected to be paid when engaging with any public official and often amount to a fixed proportion of a transaction value.

*Development investment* is a term that is commonly used by the Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) to denote spending on non-administrative costs of any ministry.

*Leadership* refers to the body of decision makers regarding a Vietnam's public policy. *Vietnamese Administration* refers to the entire Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), including all of its various state branches of leadership, the Politburo and the National Assembly (NA). In this report, *Leadership*, *Vietnamese Administration* and *CPV* are often used synonymously. See the following footnote for more information.<sup>3</sup>

*State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)* are defined in the Enterprise Law of 2014 (NA, 2014b:2) as means an enterprise in which the State holds 100% of the charter capital.

## Literature Review

The wealth of online literature on the subject of governance and the public infrastructure sector in Vietnam means that an online literature review serves as the core methodology to answer the research questions in this country study. Triangulation was used to maximise the accuracy and validity of information sources on governance, public infrastructure investment, and transparency and disclosure in theory and in practice. The following types of online resources were used for this purpose in this study:

- English and Vietnamese;
- National and International;
- Legal, Academic, Professional (reports, open tenders, etc.);
- News, and Social Media; and
- Private, Public, and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO)/Non-profit Organisations.

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<sup>3</sup>

<http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/English/TheSocialistRepublicOfVietnam/AboutVietnam/AboutVietnamDetail?categoryId=10000103&articleId=10001578>

Due to a lack of published information on some points discussed in this study, common public knowledge is cited as a data source.

## Sample selection

Chapter 6 features an assessment of compliance with disclosure requirements for 20 public infrastructure projects in Vietnam. Vietnam's first law on Access to Information was just approved in April 2016 and will come into force in 2018. However, the law only grants access to citizens and not organisations, as such contacting public entities to request information (i.e. reactive disclosure) was not possible for this study. Therefore, the assessment of compliance is based on proactive disclosure only.

Compliance is measured against two benchmarks, the first is the CoST IDS and the second is as required by Vietnamese Law. The majority of sample data was taken from ministry (PE/Project Management Unit (PMU)) websites however, some evidence was taken from project sites, which also serve as a point of disclosure.

As will be seen in Chapter 4, there are some 1,000 PEs in Vietnam. Among them, the top five largest (in terms of allocation of state budget) ministries were selected. The percentages show how much each ministry accounts for in the total development investment for all ministries. These are as follows (NA, 2016):

1. Ministry of Transport (MOT) – 26%;
2. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) – 11%;
3. Ministry of Health (MOH) – 6%;
4. Ministry of Construction (MOC) – 6%; and
5. Ministry of Education & Training (MOET) – 3%.

As such, the allocation of the 20 projects is representative of each of the five Ministries' proportion in their combined share of development investment; i.e. 10 projects (50%) under the MOT,<sup>4</sup> five (25%) under MARD, two (10%) under MOH, two (10%) under MOC, and one (5%) under MOET.<sup>5</sup> Individual projects are listed on several webpages and therefore a random number generator was used to select both the webpage and the individual project among others on each webpage list. See below for the sources for each of the five ministries:

1. MOT (two sources)
  - a. Official MOT page <http://mt.gov.vn/vn/chuyen-muc/875/du-an-dau-tu.aspx>
  - b. MOT's PPP page <http://ppp.mt.gov.vn/pppunit/Projects>
2. MARD <http://mic.mard.gov.vn/General/home/default.aspx>
3. MOH <http://moh.gov.vn/province/Pages/DuAnDangTrienKhai.aspx>
4. MOC <http://www.moc.gov.vn/en/56/-/tin-chi-tiet/1Lu9/28114>
5. Hanoi DOET <http://hanoi.edu.vn/ban-quan-ly-du-an-c1010.aspx>

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<sup>4</sup> Two sources listing MOT public infrastructure projects were found. Of the ten sample projects from MOT, five were taken from each source. For more information, please see list above.

<sup>5</sup> Due to a lack of information on the MOET website, information on public infrastructure projects from the Hanoi Department of Education and Training were used in the sample.

## Compliance Evaluation of Six Flagship Public Infrastructure Projects

At the request of CoST, a deeper analysis of six of Vietnam's most prominent current public infrastructure projects was also included in the study. These projects were selected in consultation with the Public Infrastructure specialist at the FCO in Vietnam. These are:

1. Hanoi Metro System;
2. Ho Chi Minh city Metro System;
3. North-South High-Speed Railway;
4. Long Thanh International Airport;
5. Nghi Son 2 Power Plant; and
6. Duyen Hai Power Plants.

In order to dig deeper on these six projects, information was taken from multiple sources including the websites of PEs/PMUs and contractors, and press releases. Due to the large size and notable prominence of these six projects in the public discourse, there may be a higher availability of data in the public domain in comparison to that of the 20 randomly selected projects. Comparison should be interpreted with caution.

## Assumptions

Below is a list of core assumptions that have been applied in this study:

- Development investment by each ministry is an indicator of public infrastructure investment;
- Size of investment is the main indicator of priority in terms of ranking the importance of investment in different types of public infrastructure; and
- In absence of other breakdowns of total national infrastructure spending, the FDI adverts posted on the website of the Vietnam Embassy in the US (2016) were used as an indicator of public infrastructure investment per sector in Vietnam.

# ***Vietnam in Context***





# Vietnam in Context

## A nation unique to Southeast Asia

Strategically located in the heart of SEA, Vietnam is the world's most recent and unlikely success story. In the last 30 years, the nation of over 90 million inhabitants has emerged sovereign and prosperous from a millennium of domination and turbulence. Vietnam has become a Lower-middle Income Country, according to the World Bank (2016a), which has resulted in a reduction in Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 3.8% in 2004 to 2.4% of Gross National Income in 2014 (World Bank, 2016b) and an increase in FDI (GSO, 2016).

Most generally attribute this strong economic emergence to the macroeconomic reforms of the 1990s, known as “Đổi Mới” or Renewal/Renovation. This can be seen from Vietnam's growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the last thirty years, which has consistently been ahead of that of the East Asia and Pacific and the world averages (See Figure 1 below).

**Figure 1. GDP Growth (annual %)**



Source: World Bank (2016b)

However, like almost all nations, Vietnam has not been able to safeguard its economy from the global economic slowdown but economic growth is making a strong recovery. In 2015, the Vietnamese economy grew three times as quickly as the world average.

**Table 1: Study Country Comparison of Key Economic Indicators**

<i>DATA: Economy</i>	Thailand	Malaysia	Indonesia	Vietnam
OECD Status (2016)	Non-OECD	Non-OECD	Non-OECD	Non-OECD
Economy (2016)	Upper-middle income	Upper-middle income	Lower-middle income	Lower-middle income
GNI per capita Atlas method (2015) (US\$)	5,620.00	10,570.00	3,440.00	1,980.00
Net ODA received (% of GNI) (2014)	0.1	0	0	2.4
GDP Growth (annual %) (2015)	2.8	5	4.8	6.7
Global Competitiveness (1:Best, 140: Worst) (2015-2016)	32	18	37	56

Source: OECD, World Bank, and WEF

Table 1 above shows a country comparison of some key indicators that are relevant to this study. On the whole, Vietnam arguably shows the most potential as it is the poorest in terms of per capita output but is growing the quickest.

Looking to the future, one of Vietnam's top priorities to address in order to sustain economic growth and development is to improve its governance. Vietnam is a one-party state with a state socialist orientation, making it unique in SEA. This must be taken into account when considering the role CoST plays in Vietnam. Read more about governance in Vietnam in Chapter 5.

### **Additional Information on Characteristics of Vietnam**

Vietnam is composed of a fairly homogenous population by ethnicity and belief, compared to other countries in SEA. With regard to demographics, 85% of Vietnamese are of the Kinh ethnicity, 95% are literate, and a staggering 40% of the population is aged under 24 years of age (CIA, 2016). However, while the population is expected to keep increasing for the foreseeable future (TradingEconomics, 2016), birth rates are falling fast (1.8 children per woman in 2016; CIA, 2016) and the population will age rapidly in the coming decades.

**14<sup>th</sup>** largest population in the world, in 2015 *World Bank (2016)*

The impact of such a demographic change on Vietnam's future public infrastructure mean that there will be both an increase in the pressure on public infrastructure and also a shift in demand for different types of public infrastructure, particularly regarding public transport for the elderly. This will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

In terms of topography, Vietnam is commonly divided into the following five regions, which can be cross-referenced on the following map in Figure 2 below:

- Northern Mountains (North of Hanoi),
- Red River Delta (Hanoi, Hai Phong, and Thai Binh)
- North Central (South of Thai Binh down to Hue),
- South Central or Central Highlands (Hue down to Dalat), and
- Southern Mekong Delta (South of Dalat).

The distance from North to South of Vietnam is over 1,600km, which is equivalent to a factor of 1.5 of the length of the UK (CIA, 2016). At its narrowest point, Vietnam is just 50km wide (ibid.). Furthermore, there are only a handful of ports that are sizeable enough to receive

large volumes of international shipments (WorldPortSource, 2016). The implications of these characteristics on Vietnam's dependency on road, air and rail infrastructure are both in terms of logistical and passenger transportation. This is especially the case during peak aggregate demand around the time of the Lunar New Year celebration (VietnamNews, 2016a). This will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

Between the regions, there are distinct differences in the weather, economic production, prosperity, culture, attitudes and behaviour, dialect, and so on. Regional strategies are required for any nationwide programme (Howard and Pham, 2016).

**Figure 2. Map of Vietnam**



Source: <https://goo.gl/images/KJW6ID>

## Recommendation 1

For CoST, there are obvious implications for operations. CoST should be based in the administrative capital, Hanoi, which is where most NGOs are based due to the proximity to the public ministries.

However, the bulk of private corporations (construction, financial, logistics, transportation etc.), who are key stakeholders in CoST, are based in the commercial capital, Ho Chi Minh City. Therefore, a budget should be allocated for travel between the two cities.

A photograph of two young girls in red school uniforms walking away from the camera on a path. The image is slightly blurred and has a warm, golden light. The girls are wearing red dresses with white trim and carrying bags. The background shows a path leading through a natural, outdoor setting.

***Public Infrastructure  
Investment and Delivery  
in Vietnam***

# Public Infrastructure Investment and Delivery in Vietnam

## Current public infrastructure investment, 2016-2020

MPI is responsible for managing the planning and oversight of domestic and foreign direct investment in Vietnam. According to MPI, US\$90 billion is required to meet public infrastructure needs between 2016 and 2020 (CPV, 2016). This is generally in-line with external (non-MPI) estimates in Table 2 below.

**US\$90 billion**  
needed for public infrastructure  
2016-2020 CPV (2016)

The CPV issued the Socioeconomic Development Strategy for 2011-20, in which public infrastructure is identified to be one of three “strategic breakthroughs” in order for Vietnam to be considered to be a modern oriented country by 2020 (CPV, 2011). However, the strategy is limited to rhetoric that lacks empirical basis. There is no other integrated national strategy for public infrastructure in Vietnam although sectoral strategies do exist.<sup>6</sup>

**Table 2: Estimated Annual Investment Needs**

Source	Average US\$ bn per year	Reference
Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI): 2016-20	18	CPV (2016)
EuroCham – 2011-20	16	Boots et al. (2012)
Duane Morris LLP (2015): 2011-20	17	Lexington (2015)

## Projected public infrastructure investment, 2014-2024

**US\$300 billion**  
public infrastructure gap 2014-2024  
*Tuoi Tre (2014)*

From 2014 to 2024, US\$500 billion total investment is needed for public infrastructure spending. MPI has stated that US\$200 billion has been allocated from the public budget, leaving a gap of US\$300 billion (Tuoi Tre, 2014) which will need to be filled with investment from the private sector. However, this will be challenging; in the

period from 2011-2015, private sector investment in public infrastructure was just 17.6% compared to 39% private sector investment in real estate development (Dau Thau, 2016). Given that 60% of investment needs for public infrastructure from 2014-2024 will need to come from the private sector, Vietnam has a substantial challenge ahead.


The CPV will provide seed capital in order to attract FDI to public infrastructure projects. In order to provide enough state-backed seed capital, adjustments are planned for the structure of the state budget. Revenue during the 5-year period from 2016-2020 will need to increase 1.7 times that of 2011-2015 (Ibid.). At the same time, the CPV has committed to cutting its

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/English/strategies>

recurrent operational costs from 67% of total public spending to 60-62%, and public spending on public infrastructure is due to increase by 25-26% (Ibid.).

Generating public revenue will mean less reliance on ODA and with increasing international pressure on Vietnam to free up trade, tax revenue collection will play a more important role. Figure 3 shows that almost 95% of total state revenue in 2016 will come from taxes. ODA only accounts for 0.3% of total state revenue and will only diminish further, especially as the World Bank has committed to phase out its preferential loan issuance from July 2017 and it is expected that the ADB will follow soon after (VietnamNet, 2016).

**Figure 3: State Budget Expected Revenue in 2016**



Source: National Assembly (2015a)

However, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has a strategic interest in Vietnam and will continue to provide preferential loans to Vietnam at near 0% interest rates and with 20-30 year repayment terms (VietnamNet, 2016). JICA has a core focus on providing Vietnam with preferential loans in the Transportation and Natural Resources and Energy sectors, and technical cooperation in other areas of public infrastructure such as Education and Health (JICA, 2016a). In the Governance space, JICA is providing technical assistance for Legal and Judicial Reform (Ibid.).<sup>7</sup>

## Addressing the infrastructure investment gap

Addressing the infrastructure investment gap in light of diminishing ODA will mean mobilising multiple avenues of finance, including soft and commercial loans, and grants. One way to raise funds is by making adjustments to the state budget, which were mentioned above. Private investment and public debt are two additional options that will be discussed below.

In order to attract more private investment, the National Assembly (NA) – which is essentially a parliament/senate comprised of senior representatives from different branches of the CPV

<sup>7</sup> An up-to-date map of JICA's projects is available via [https://libportal.jica.go.jp/library/Data/PlanInOperation-e/SoutheastAsia/027\\_Viet%20Nam-e.pdf](https://libportal.jica.go.jp/library/Data/PlanInOperation-e/SoutheastAsia/027_Viet%20Nam-e.pdf) (JICA, 2016b)

– updated the Law on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in 2015 under Decree No. 15/2015/ND-CP (NA, 2015). This revision combined several PPP-related laws into one and clarified the law surrounding build, operate, transfer (BOT); build, transfer, operate (BTO); and build and transfer (BT) arrangements.

The newest PPP law makes provisions for the issuance of guarantees and viability gap funding to help to offset risk and ensure that those projects that are economically viable go ahead without investment being a barrier.

USAID has been working with the CPV on competitiveness, organising study tours and workshops, and providing technical assistance (USAID, 2015). Key outcomes of USAID cooperation on PPPs are the following:

1. Establishment of an inter-ministerial steering committee on PPPs and dedicated office; and
2. Creation of a US\$20 million Project Development Facility and Viability Gap Fund.<sup>8</sup>

MPI also set up a department to attract FDI to Vietnam, called the Foreign Investment Agency (FIA). Foreign investors can find information including the latest news and PPP rules, sectoral analyses, life in Vietnam etc. via their website (FIA, 2016). The English and Vietnamese websites are kept updated.

MPI efforts to spur FDI appear to be working, FDI increased by 10% from 21.9 billion in 2014 to 24.1 billion in 2015 (GSO, 2016), which was among the highest rates of growth in 15 years (Vietnam News, 2016b). However, MPI found that 80% of technologies used by FDI companies were average technologies (low tech and labour intensive) as opposed to the 6% of technologies that were considered to be advanced/high tech technologies (Ibid.). MPI acknowledges the need for Vietnam to leverage FDI more and therefore also need to focus on upgrading FDI (Ibid.). This is important as population growth is slowing and the demand for labour-intensive jobs will reduce over time. Furthermore, there are already government-sponsored re-training programmes for farmers and rural workers that are selling/leaving their/the land and urbanising.

PM Nguyen Tan Dung recently approved co-financing with the World Bank to run the pilot project of the City Infrastructure Financing Facility (CIFF). The idea of the CIFF was first proposed by the World Bank in 2014 in response to the infrastructure spending gap by attracting private sector investment (MPI, 2014). It will serve as a second tier lender for commercial banks (first tier lenders) when lending to provincial/municipal government entities for investment in municipal public infrastructure projects (Vietnam Breaking News, 2016a).

Attracting private finance in Vietnam's public infrastructure will certainly be a challenge. Assuming that the right investment models are in place, one remaining key concern shared by foreign businesses in Vietnam surrounds enforcement of contracts, and taking foreign currency out of Vietnam.

As seen in Figure 3 above, ODA accounts for a small fraction of total state revenue. With the withdrawal of cheap loan extension from international lenders such as the World Bank and ADB, JICA remains a key source of ODA financing, especially in public infrastructure. The Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) may become a more important stakeholder in ODA for Vietnam. Vietnam is already its top recipient of ODA in the Asia region. KOICA is

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<sup>8</sup> Viability Gap Funding (VGF) reduces the upfront capital costs of pro-poor private infrastructure investments by providing grant funding at the time of financial close, which can be used during construction (Private Infrastructure Development Group, 2014). "Financial close" refers to the *stage in a financial agreement where conditions have been satisfied or waived, documents executed, and draw-downs become permissible.* (<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/financial-close.html>)



providing ODA for the development of Vietnam’s online procurement portal. However, its focus to date has been on education, health, and rural development (KOICA, 2016), with no inclusion of transport infrastructure. Other bilateral donors have significantly scaled down ODA support in Vietnam since it became a lower-middle income country.

Public funds may become available given the adjustments to the state budget and slow but steady sale of state assets, including equity in many of the SOEs (Vietnam Net, 2015). This could theoretically serve as a last resort stopgap in the event of limited private sector investment in public infrastructure.

If private finance and ODA remains limited, Vietnam will need to make further adjustments to the state budget and borrow in the form of sovereign debt issuance and commercial loans; this will mean improving its credit rating. Rating agency Standard and Poor rated long-term Vietnamese sovereign debt at BB- (VN Express, 2016), which is worse than the BBB+ awarded to that of Thailand (FTSE Global Markets, 2015). The difference in the rating is quite stark; see below:<sup>9</sup>

- An obligation rated 'BB' is less vulnerable to nonpayment than other speculative issues. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions which could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.
- An obligation rated 'BBB' exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.

**66.4% of GDP**

public debt ratio in 2015

*Vietnam News (2015b)*

Clearly, Vietnam needs to improve its credit rating by building in resilience. However, towards the end of 2016, Vietnam’s “government debt” – the MPI’s alternative measure of the common public debt measure used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which excludes State Bank

debt, SOE debt and social security organisations’ debt – had almost reached the NA’s debt ceiling of 65% of GDP (Vietnam News, 2016e). Vietnam News (2015b) reported that “government debt” in 2015 was 59.9% but after factoring for other forms of public debt (mentioned above), amounted to 66.4%. Furthermore, Vietnam’s 66.4% public debt ratio is almost 50% higher than that of Thailand, which stood at 43% in 2016 (The Nation, 2016). This may put additional pressure on the country to repay its debts faster unless the NA decides to raise the debt ratio ceiling. According to the NA (2015), projected debt and aid repayments amounted to 12%, compared to 20% spent on development assistance.

## Recommendation 2

Historically, the CPV generally follows through on any of its decisions including those related to improvements in governance. However, the CPV will do so on its own watch, when the time is right. CoST should consider longer project phasing in Vietnam to ensure sufficient flexibility and accommodate for setbacks, for example delays to any required amendments in policy and legislation.

<sup>9</sup> [https://www.standardandpoors.com/en\\_EU/delegate/getPDF;jsessionid=tjuuWTp-lqqifXuFew5P8dmKDaTkQ702BiXKVJxr7pPGD7yYwebe!1565035297?articleId=1663724&type=COMMENTS&subType=REGULATORY](https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_EU/delegate/getPDF;jsessionid=tjuuWTp-lqqifXuFew5P8dmKDaTkQ702BiXKVJxr7pPGD7yYwebe!1565035297?articleId=1663724&type=COMMENTS&subType=REGULATORY)

## Priority infrastructure investment needs

In its 2016 annual Global Competitiveness Report, the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2016) evaluated the quality of public infrastructure in 140 countries including Vietnam. Table 3 (below) shows how Vietnam performed on the key large-scale, public infrastructure types. Here, quality of infrastructure in Vietnam is benchmarked against other countries to identify top priority sectors of public infrastructure for improvement.

Vietnam is ranked in the bottom half of countries globally for its overall infrastructure quality as well as by sector, with the exception of rail and mobile telephone. Vietnam performs significantly worse than other countries in the assessment on road quality in comparison to any other infrastructure type (excluding fixed landlines, which are largely obsolete in Vietnam due to technology leapfrogging). The Wall Street Journal (WSJ, 2015) estimate that only 32% of roads are in good condition and 68% require rebuilding/upgrading. This is especially concerning given that road transport is the second most important freight type in Vietnam in terms of the volume of cargo transported annually, after shipping (GSO, 2016). Furthermore, labour mobility depends on the 43 million motorbikes and 2 million private cars on the road (VNExpress, 2016a) – that is almost one motorbike per two people in Vietnam. Buses and coaches also play a key role in public transport, as a far cheaper substitute to air travel.

Vietnam is also the gateway to Indochina, goods and raw materials arriving at one of the many ports along Vietnam’s 3,400km (2,100 mile) coastline before being distributed by road, often over its mountain passes into Cambodia and Laos. The hilly terrain and core-periphery relation between Vietnam and the rest of Indochina explains the absence of cross-border rail systems. Therefore, roads are arguably the highest priority large-scale, public infrastructure type.

**Table 3: Key Public Infrastructure Quality Ranking in 2015**

Type of Infrastructure	Score (1 = low, 7 = high)	Global Ranking (1 = best, 140 = worst)
All	3.5/7	99
Road	3.3/7	<b>93</b>
Rail	3.2/7	48
Port	3.9/7	76
Air	4.2/7	75
Electricity	4.1/7	87
Fixed Line Telephone	6 lines per 100 people	100
Mobile Telephone	147.1 subscriptions per 100 people	<b>28</b>

(WEF, 2016)

## Actual investment priorities versus investment needs

In the National State Budget plan for 2015, every ministry was allocated a budget for development investment, which amounted to a total of US\$ 1.2 billion (NA, 2016). Table 3 (above) shows the six ministries with the largest development investment budgets in 2015. These figures exclude debt and aid payments as well as recurrent running costs so they are broadly equivalent to public infrastructure investment.

Table 4 below shows that the MOT spent the most (26% of total development expenditure) on development investment in 2015 and furthermore, 71% of the MOT's budget was foreign capital. This makes sense with a lot of the preferential loan support from JICA being focused on transport infrastructure. Among JICA's list of ongoing projects in Vietnam, which is up-to-date as of February 2016, 22% (25 of 115) of projects were transport-oriented (JICA, 2016a). This is fairly high considering that JICA works across 15 to 20 areas of international development. Among these transport projects, around 70% were road-related projects.

Another interesting finding is that the development investment by the Ministry of Construction (MOC) and Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) – covering sectors from urban infrastructure to energy and mining – was at least 90% domestically financed. This has implications for the level of compliance and oversight within these sectors, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

**Table 4: Top six Ministries by Size of Development Investment (2015)**

	Ministry	US\$ million			% Foreign Capital	% of Total Development Investment Expenditure by All Ministries
		Total Expenditure	Domestic Capital Expenditure	Foreign Capital Expenditure		
1	Ministry of Transportation (MOT)	311.6	89.8	221.7	<b>71%</b>	<b>26%</b>
2	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)	135.7	85.4	50.2	37%	11%
3	Ministry of Health (MOH)	70.9	42.5	28.5	40%	6%
4	Ministry of Construction (MOC)	69.5	67.7	1.8	<b>3%</b>	6%
5	Ministry of Education and Training (MOET)	38.1	28.6	9.6	25%	3%
6	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE)	34.6	31.1	3.5	<b>10%</b>	3%
Total		660.3	345.0	315.3	NA	54%


Source: NA (2016)

Among large-scale, public infrastructure types, roads were identified to be top priority in the previous sub-section (Priority Infrastructure Investment Needs). The Vietnam Embassy in the US (2016) posts a list of public infrastructure investment opportunities (mostly PPPs) to attract private/institutional investors from the US. Among Vietnam’s other key strategic FDI partners (Korea and Japan notably), only the Vietnamese Embassy in the US posts such a list of FDI offers.

In absence of other such data being available publicly, the US FDI figures are used in this study to serve as an indicator of overall investment priorities in public infrastructure in Vietnam. The Vietnam Embassy in the US aims to find US\$47 billion via this platform by 2020.<sup>10</sup> This is just over half of the infrastructure investment gap of US\$90 billion to be secured between 2016 and 2020 (CPV, 2016). Figure 4 below shows that roads and railway account for the largest share of total FDI from the US on public infrastructure until 2020, 33% and 27% respectively. Given the assumptions, this suggests that actual investment priorities do match infrastructure investment needs.

While the budgets of Vietnamese Ministries are published online, the budgets of Ministry departments are not. Furthermore, the lack of a national roadmap for the transport and infrastructure sectors makes it difficult to validate the assertion from the data in Figure 4 below. However, earlier in 2016 the Deputy Prime Minister stated that road infrastructure was key to economic development particularly in the northwest region of Vietnam (Vietnam Net, 2016b). The context of the northwest region is quite different; being remote and mountainous, communities need better roads in order to be connected to the market so that they can sustainably improve their livelihoods. This commitment is yet another indication that road infrastructure is a high priority among the Vietnamese Administration. Furthermore, road transport is a core focus area for JICA, as discussed earlier (JICA, 2016a).

**Figure 4: United States FDI in Public Infrastructure by Sector**



Source: Vietnam Embassy in US (2016)

<sup>10</sup> This figure excludes the investments listed in sections III to V (Agriculture, Preservation and Processing, and Production Services) as they were not deemed to be public infrastructure by the definition used in this study. Please refer to the source for more details.

## Structure and composition of the sector

### ***Procuring Entities (PEs)***

Unlike many countries in SEA, Vietnam has thousands of PEs, comprising of central and local level administrative entities (TI, 2011:16-17). At the central level of government, the Vietnamese Administration is made up of 22 Ministries and Ministerial-level agencies, which are made up of many different departments.<sup>11</sup> For example, the MOT is made up of departments for roads, rail, inland waterways, ports, aviation etc.

At the local level, each of the 63 provinces and municipalities have a separate Provincial People's Committee, which is also comprised of different departments. Provinces and municipalities are divided into districts that are governed by District People's Committees. The District People's Committees are also made up of divisions. Districts in urban areas are divided into wards while districts in rural areas are divided into communes, each of which is governed by a Ward/Commune People's Committee.

MPI can assign any of the administrative entities mentioned above to be the Project Owner (PO), which will in turn create a PE or Project Management Unit (PMU) internally to manage each specific public infrastructure project. The only exception is for the Ward/Commune People's Committees, which may or may not house the role of PO/PMU due to capacity constraints; they are often comprised of just a handful of administrators.

This situation is further complicated by the existence of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). SOEs are defined in the Enterprise Law of 2014 (NA, 2014b:2) as means an enterprise in which the State holds 100% of the charter capital. The assets of Vietnamese SOEs are equivalent to 80% of Vietnam's GDP (Vietnam News, 2015). To put the US\$129.6 billion into context, it is equivalent to a staggering three times the GDP of Macau or over twice the GDP of Myanmar in 2015 (World Bank, 2016c). Despite their size, the output of Vietnamese SOEs contributes to only 30% of GDP (VN Express, 2016). In short, this implies that Vietnamese SOEs are large in size and inefficient, given the resources they have at their disposal.

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/English/ministries>

## Case Study: SOE Mismanagement and Inefficiencies

Inefficiencies within Vietnamese SOEs are often linked to mismanagement in their leadership. For example, the General Director, his two Deputies, and the Chief Accountant of Petro Vietnam Construction (PVC), the construction arm of Petro Vietnam Oil and Gas (PV) SOE, are in custody for mismanaging PVC's role as main contractor for PV projects (VN Express, 2016c). No arrest warrant has been issued for the Chairman. Social media commentary suggests that he has gone into hiding.

This is not the first time PV has been in the news in relation to corruption claims. In 2012, Song Da Construction Company, a subsidiary of PV made the headlines in Vietnam for mismanagement of assets and bad investments amounting to USD 1.5bn (FT, 2012). The two commentators in the in the readers' comments section of the FT article are interesting because they represent the dichotomous views of the Vietnamese general public; one pessimistic commentator said that such corruption scandals hit the newspapers in Vietnam but disappear the following week and all is forgotten. The second more optimistic commentator backed the CPV efforts, saying that it has come a long way in its innovative approaches to tackle corruption.

### **Procurement Process**

The Law on Procurement outlines the rules on public procurement in Vietnam and was last amended in 2014. The English version is not available on the Ministry of Justice website however, an unofficial version is available on iExpert (2014). In general, competitive bidding is used in public procurement in Vietnam. Direct sourcing is only used for projects that concern national security or have a very limited number of potential bidders. For example, there may be only one firm that has the capacity to produce very unique inputs with highly technical specifications. Competitive bidding can be either International Competitive Bidding (ICB) or National Competitive Bidding (NCB), depending on the nature of the tender. Most donors will require the relevant PO to use ICB for alignment with international standards and quality control and/or for knowledge exchange/capacity building.

KOICA provided a US\$3 million grant to develop Vietnam's first eProcurement portal (e-Procurement Portal, 2011). The NA provided US\$380,000 in co-financing and MPI is the PO.

Looking to the future, MPI is seeking to upgrade KOICA's first eProcurement portal so that it serves as a single window for public procurement. After seven years of development, this portal is still being tested and developed. Reasons why development has taken so long will be discussed in the next chapter. Currently, several projects and bidder profiles are accessible, which can be found by accessing the following [link](#).<sup>12</sup> The Vietnamese version of the site is far more developed than the English version.

The pilot website suggests that the portal might also be used to disclose project information post-procurement. The portal is due for further development in 2018 just before launching in

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<sup>12</sup> <http://muasamcong.mpi.gov.vn>

2019, and it is expected that 100% of public procurement will be disclosed online by 2025 (Vietnam Economic Times, 2016). The Leadership estimate that 3%-20% of operational costs associated with tendering will be saved as a result of enhanced transparency and reduced corruption.

### ***Funding sources and disbursement***

There are generally four funding sources that can be allocated for public infrastructure projects:

1. Central state budget;
2. Local province/district budget;
3. ODA; and
4. Private sector investment/FDI.

In the case that a Provincial or District People's Committee is assigned to be the PO, they will often be localised public infrastructure projects such as minor road repairs or drainage maintenance. In such cases, the PO will be expected to finance the project through local tax collection and without central budget support.

## **Recommendation 3**

Many PEs at the level of the Provincial People's Committees and below will finance and manage public infrastructure projects autonomously. Therefore, CoST should ensure that the implementation of the national programme is broad enough in scope and includes a plan to engage local PEs in the regions and provinces – not just ministries and central government agencies.

In the case of a PPP arrangement, joint ventures with up to 100% private ownership are common but often under BOT terms (Vietnam Embassy in the US, 2016). This typically means that a contractor has at least ten years to operate the public infrastructure asset (once construction has completed) in order to recover the money invested, repay any liabilities, and make a profit.

In the case of ODA funded projects, ODA loans are signed and received by the State Bank and managed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). A PMU will then open two separate accounts, one for ODA funds and the other for state funds, and is required to write to the MOF for any disbursement of funds.

### ***Oversight***

The PMU is responsible for developing a procurement plan that is submitted to the PO for approval. The PMU must also submit the procurement plan to the Public Purchasing Authority (PPA), which is a department within MPI that is responsible for disclosing information online. The PPA also conducts monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of public procurement activities. MPI is responsible for development of national strategies such as the Socioeconomic Development Plan and ensuring coordination with the provincial and municipal authorities in order to put national strategies into action.

Post-procurement, during construction and implementation phases, the MOC is the key policymaker, lawmaker (Construction Law, MOC, 2014), and regulator. It is also important to remember that the MOC also takes the role of PE for some projects. This means that the

MOC is a key stakeholder for CoST to seek endorsement from in order to run a CoST programme with scale.

However, there are several laws requiring information disclosure which are regulated by other ministries. As such, there is no shortage of public agencies providing oversight; these include the State Audit Office, MOF Inspectorate, Government Inspectorate, and relevant Inspectorates attached to each of the Ministries and Provincial People's Committees. Any public overseeing agency has the right to investigate a case, which according to the penal code, would potentially mean penalties for a PE or delays in project completion. With so many agencies providing oversight from different public bodies though, there is plenty of room for manipulation and an increased opportunity for bribes.

### **Construction firms**

Construction is a major sector in Vietnam, with the top 100 construction companies' assets amounting to US\$7 billion in 2016, which grew 12.4% from 2015-2016 (Soha News, 2016). The top five construction firms in Vietnam – all of which are Vietnamese corporations – by net sales in the fourth quarter of 2015 were as follows:

1. Cotec Construction Joint Stock Company;<sup>13</sup>
2. PetroVietnam Construction Joint Stock Corporation;<sup>14</sup>
3. Vietnam Import and Export Construction Corporation;
4. Tasco Joint Stock Corporation;<sup>15</sup> and
5. Hoa Binh Real Estate and Construction Joint Stock Corporation.<sup>16</sup>

The five firms above account for 50% of industry revenue alone, indicating that the construction sector in Vietnam is dominated by Vietnamese companies. The Vietnam Association of Construction Contractors (VACC) was established around 2000 to support the growth and efficiency of the construction industry by working with construction companies and the government. However, the website is inactive.<sup>17</sup>

## **Recommendation 4**

MOC is key to the implementation of CoST. Therefore, CoST must secure explicit endorsement and support from MOC for CoST in Vietnam. Once this commitment is obtained, CoST, in conjunction with MOC, must actively publicise this endorsement to ensure that all stakeholders are aware that CoST has been endorsed by the Vietnamese Leadership at the highest political and executive levels.

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.coteccons.vn>

<sup>14</sup> <http://pvc.vn/en-us/news/newsdetails/tabid/211/id/615/PetroVietnam-Construction-Joint-Stock-Corporation-Implementation-of-restructuring-manufacturing-and-high-efficiency-trading.aspx>

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.tasco.com.vn>

<sup>16</sup> <http://hbcr.vn/site/index.php?route=common/home>

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.vacc.vn/2016/06/tap-chi-nha-thau-thi-truong-xay-dung.html> ; To view the website, please visit <http://www.vacc.vn/2016/06/tap-chi-nha-thau-thi-truong-xay-dung.html>



## Recommendation 5

CoST must build strategic partnerships with key institutions across stakeholder groups.

For government, this will include MPI, MOT and the State Audit Office among others.

Given the closely intertwined relationship between government and the Vietnamese construction industry, it is also vital to work with the private sector. Given the relative inactivity of the VACC, CoST should partner with the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) to involve and mobilise the private sector on transparency issues. In addition, CoST should, in so far as it is practicable, explore options for involving VACC.

It will also be important for CoST to work with civil society; key recommendations on how to involve civil society actors will be discussed later in Chapter 6.



***Governance in Vietnam***


## Governance in Vietnam

The World Bank defines governance as “the **process** – by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make the rules, and by which those rules are enforced and modified.”<sup>18</sup>

The current Vietnamese system of governance is based on a one-party state, which is currently led by a nineteen-member Politburo. Politburo members include roles such as the General Secretary at the top, the Prime Minister, President, and several others. Members are elected internally from within the CPV and are responsible for making all key leadership decisions for the country. Decisions are passed down from central government to local government in the form of Decrees and Decisions (See Appendix 1 for an organogram).<sup>19</sup>

As mentioned in Chapter 4, local government is comprised of provincial and municipal departments associated with each central ministry, and People’s Committees, which are equivalent to municipal/district councils. Municipalities and provinces are divided into districts and further, into communes, and finally wards (which is equivalent to a small neighbourhood). The most localised level of governance is the ward- or neighbourhood-level council. Residents of any neighbourhood are obliged to register with their local neighbourhood council and follow their instruction for all official paperwork. This allows the Vietnamese Administration to exercise effective authority over the vast majority of the population. Given its governance structure, Figure 5 below provides possible CoST strategies for successful implementation in Vietnam.

**Figure 5: Possible CoST Strategies within the Governance Structure in Vietnam**



From the Politburo at the very top level of governance, Decrees and Decisions are passed all the way down from the highest level to the neighbourhood-level and at each level, the

<sup>18</sup>

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/EXTMNAREGTOPGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:20513159~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:497024,00.html>

<sup>19</sup> [http://envietnam.org/library/Law%20articles/Structure\\_of\\_legal\\_docs\\_in\\_VN.pdf](http://envietnam.org/library/Law%20articles/Structure_of_legal_docs_in_VN.pdf)

legislation is localised to suit the local context. This has two key implications that largely explain the widespread petty corruption that exists today in Vietnam, which are explained below:

1. The size of the Vietnamese Administration as a whole is extremely large; and
2. There can be subtle variation in legislation and procedure from neighbourhood-to-neighbourhood, and significant variation between districts and provinces.

In terms of the size of the Vietnamese Administration, neighbourhood-level councils are usually staffed by at least 5-10 civil servants whilst higher levels of government have significantly more staff; one can therefore get an idea of the sheer scale of the administrative components of the one-party state. As a result, public sector salaries are extremely low. For example, the outgoing Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, was reported to receive a monthly salary of just US\$805 (Tuoi Tre, 2013).

In general, the lowest level public sector worker – neighbourhood council officers' assistants, junior traffic police, junior teachers, and even a junior doctor – officially earns as low as US\$100 per month. That translates into US\$3 per day on average, which is extremely low when you consider that some such positions hold significant authority. To put that into perspective, a private sector salary for an office assistant with around two years' experience starts at US\$400 per month (First Alliances, 2016).

The second implication of the governance structure in Vietnam is the substantial variation in legislation and procedure. As in many Asian countries, there is no shortage of official paperwork. In Vietnam, job applications require a CV that is signed and stamped by the neighbourhood council in which the job applicant resides. ID card and passport applications, marriage certificates, reports of a theft, and so on all require documents that have been locally verified. Given the lack of clarity on legislation and procedure at the neighbourhood-level, there is plenty of scope for low-salary neighbourhood councilors to make processes for obtaining official documentation overly complex. It is commonly known among locals that it is quicker and easier for a resident to get what they need from the neighbourhood council either through personal relations or by paying informal payments.

The World Bank (2014) conducted a corruption perceptions survey among three groups; citizens, businesses, and government officials. The World Bank (2014) argues that all three groups contribute to a vicious cycle of corruption in Vietnam. In this cycle, government officials as well as businesses and citizens are incentivised to pay because informal payments serve as an enabler for the giver. The World Bank's (2016e) Doing Business in Vietnam survey assesses business climates in 189 countries around the world. In particular, one aspect of the survey relates to obtaining construction permits. In this respect, Vietnam did surprisingly well, 12<sup>th</sup> in the world in fact. This may be a confirmation of how the vicious cycle of corruption plays out in Vietnam, under which informal payments are actually seen positively among business people in order to get things done.

This means that the current governance structure in Vietnam is conducive to nationwide petty corruption.

## Recommendation 6

CoST should work with government, industry and civil society to develop a comprehensive action plan to effect organisational behavioural change within existing institutions. This should include consideration of potential incentives to drive compliance with transparency requirements. For example, CoST could advocate for performance bonuses for public officials/procuring entities that perform well.

### **Governance Indicators**


Table 5 below shows the key governance indicators for Vietnam. Vietnam was ranked among the most corrupt countries globally, 112<sup>th</sup> out of 168 countries. Among Asia Pacific Countries, Vietnam achieved a score of 31/100 in 2015 (see Figure 6 below, whereby a score of 0 is highly corrupt and a score of 100 is very clean). Vietnam has made progress in this area over the last ten years however, in the last three years (between 2012 and 2015), Vietnam's CPI score has remained at 31/100. During the three-year period, Vietnam's ranking only improved (112/168 in 2015 vs. 123/176 in 2012) because other countries' CPI scores have become worse and some countries have in fact dropped out of the most recent studies.

The Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI, 2015:60) conducted a survey of businesses in Vietnam in 2014, which found that significantly more firms report having to pay informal payments<sup>20</sup> between 2013 and 2014, especially during procurement and customs clearance processes. This suggests that corruption is actually worsening rather than stabilising, as reported by the CPI.

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<sup>20</sup> Defined in the Key Definitions section in the Methodology as, "Informal payments represent all exchanges of money or gifts that are not required by contract or law."

Figure 6: CPI 2015 by Asia Pacific Country



Source: TI (2016)

On other governance indicators, such as political rights and civil liberties, Vietnam and Thailand are fairly similar but fall behind Malaysia and Indonesia (see Table 5). The same is true for freedom of press, although Vietnam performs worse than Thailand.

**Table 5: Study Country Comparison of Key Governance Indicators**

<i>DATA: Governance</i>	Thailand	Malaysia	Indonesia	Vietnam
TI CPI South East Asia (1:Best, 10: Worst) (2015)	3	2	4	6
TI CPI (1: Best, 168: Worst) (2015)	76	54	88	112
Freedom in the World (2016)	Not Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Not Free
Political Rights (1 = most free and 7 = least free) (2016)	6	4	2	7
Civil Liberties (1 = most free and 7 = least free) (2016)	6	4	4	5
Freedom Rating (1 = most free and 7 = least free) (2016)	5.5	4	3	6
Freedom of Press (2016)	Not Free	Not Free	Partly Free	Not Free
Freedom of Press (0 = Best, 100 = Worst) (2016)	77	67	49	85
Average World Bank Governance Score (1: Low, 100: High) (2014)	44	67	40	37
Voice and Accountability	26	37	53	10
Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism	17	59	4	46
Government Effectiveness	66	84	55	52
Regulatory Quality	62	76	49	30
Rule of Law	51	75	42	45
Control of Corruption	42	68	34	38

Source: Transparency International (TI), Freedom House, World Bank

With regards to press freedoms, most media outlets are owned by the CPV (Freedom House, 2015a). Furthermore, Freedom House argues that the CPV “generally views the media as a tool for the promotion of party and state policy, and authorities often intervene directly to either place or censor content.” The same applies for censorship on the Internet. Overall, Freedom House (2015a and 2015b) concludes that the Vietnamese press and Internet are ‘not free’, citing numerous cases of harassment and arrests of bloggers.

The 1999 Law on Media prohibits the publication of information that is deemed to be “untruthful, distorted, or slanderous and harmful to an individual or organization.” This Law restricts freedom of speech and assembly for Vietnamese. Two bloggers were recently arrested and given 3-year sentences for posting 24 articles on politics, economics, and society that were deemed to be “based on untrue and groundless content and meant to distort policies of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the State” (VNExpress, 2016). Due to internet censorship and a lack of press freedom, it was not possible to validate whether the prosecutor’s claim was justified.

Figure 7: Selection of headlines about corruption in Vietnam in 2016



Sources: Various

Globally, right to information and a free media have proven critical for exposing corruption. However, in Vietnam, any public criticisms of the government is prohibited. There is no shortage of grand corruption cases in Vietnam, as the top-heavy SOEs and restricted media offer ample opportunity for grand corruption to take place without accountability. Some Vietnamese say that the very fact that some corruption cases are being published is progress in itself, while others believe that they are simply political games. See Figure 7 above for some examples from 2016.

Demonstrations are rare in Vietnam but are on the increase (The Diplomat, 2016). The Vietnamese police recently shut down one march in central Vietnam in protest against the unfair compensation paid by Formosa, a Taiwanese steel company that was responsible for the death of 80 tonnes of fish (Radio Free Asia, 2016). As already mentioned, Freedom House (2015) classifies Vietnam as ‘not free’ across their indices from freedom of speech to religious expression and freedom of assembly.

When it comes to citizens’ participation in public policy, Vietnam faces challenges according to the International Budget Partnership (2016). Vietnam scored 42/100 in terms of the level of public participation in budgeting (see Appendix 3). Further, Budget Partnership (2016) notes that very little budget information is available online and that there are limited opportunities for citizens to engage in the budget process. The NGO Resource Centre provides a regularly updated International NGO (INGO) directory that can be accessed via the following [link](http://www.ngocentre.org.vn/ingodirectory).<sup>21</sup> Basic searches reveal that there are not yet any INGOs registered as operating in Vietnam with a core focus on construction or infrastructure. Therefore, CoST is likely to be a first-mover in this sector.

All of these factors mean that Vietnam’s overall governance environment is poorer than its neighboring countries. This is reflected in Vietnam’s World Bank Governance score, as well as all of the subcomponents. The only exception is on Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, for which Vietnam is second among the four countries to Malaysia. This is easily explained; in Chapter 3, it was highlighted that there are regional differences between

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.ngocentre.org.vn/ingodirectory>



Vietnamese. However, these regional differences do not translate into divides in society. The Vietnamese are a largely homogenous group of people by ethnicity and religion.<sup>22</sup>

## Recommendation 7

Given the limited press freedoms in Vietnam, coupled with the prevalence of state-owned media agencies, CoST implementation must include a programme for building the capacity of the local press and media. This should centre on the importance of integrity and objectivity in reporting and investigative journalism. Media officials must understand their duties and responsibilities in disseminating information to citizens.

## Recommendation 8

Public participation in Vietnam remains constrained and there are few formal channels through which citizens can hold the government to account. CoST should position itself as a safe platform for dialogue and collaboration between government and citizens. In this way, citizens are consulted/engaged on public infrastructure projects and this will go a long way towards building trust in the Vietnamese Leadership.

### ***Anti-corruption Efforts***

Officially, the Penal Code (WorldLII, 2016) and the 2005 Anti-corruption Law (NA, 2005) clearly outline the Vietnamese Administration's position on corruption. The latter offers whistleblowers protection however, U4<sup>23</sup> TI (2012:6) argue that there is no anonymous channel of reporting, which means that civil servants have to report cases directly to their supervisors.

There is also a National Strategy on Anti-corruption to 2020, which has a key focus on transparency (U4 TI, 2012:7). Under this roadmap, thousands of workshops have been delivered to almost 1.5 million officials to raise awareness on the Administration's stance on corruption (VN Breaking News, 2016b). Furthermore, hundreds of documents have been produced to facilitate the adoption of these centrally issued decisions and decrees.

One of the key components of the Anti-corruption legislation is the mandatory disclosure of public officials' finances, including receipts and expenditure (GAN Business Corruption Portal,

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<sup>22</sup> 85% of Vietnamese are of the same ethnicity and 70% report that they are non-religious (Howard & Pham, 2016)

<sup>23</sup> U4 refers to the specific research centre under TI that combines the efforts of the original four ministers of international development from Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and the UK. The collaboration was known as the "Utstein partnership", hence U4.

2015). The Penal Code also stipulates that gifts over a certain value must be declared by politicians (WorldLII, 2016). However, many politicians would register gifts such as land, houses, and cash in their spouse's or child's name to avoid having to declare them. The most recent redraft of the Anti-corruption Law will extend to the families of politicians (VNExpress, 2016d). However, it is still possible for politicians to get around this amendment by asking friends to register any gifts, which is not yet unlawful and would be difficult to trace and enforce.

Other legislative efforts by the Vietnamese Administration to reduce corruption include the following:

- Establishment of the Office of the Steering Committee on Anti-corruption (OSCAC) in 2007 (U4 TI, 2012:7);
- Signing of the UN Convention on Anti-corruption in 2009 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009); and,
- Public Administration Reform (including revisions to the laws on Enterprise and Investment) to simplify regulation governing companies and promote merit-based recruitment (VN Express, 2016d).

However, as evidenced by Vietnam's CPI statistics, these efforts have proven to be largely ineffective at tackling corruption.

At a recent session to review the 2005 Anti-corruption Law, Truong Hoa Binh, Deputy Prime Minister who is in charge of anti-corruption efforts in Vietnam, said: "The fight against corruption has failed to achieve its target" (VNExpress, 2016d). Politburo member and Secretary of the municipal Party's Committee Hoang Trung Hai explained in a State working session that more needs to be done to tackle corruption (VN Breaking News, 2016b). Hai said that there were "shortcomings in the field, including inadequate understanding of the fight among a number of Party members and ineffective implementation of anti-corruption work." It is positive that the Deputy Prime Minister acknowledged this in public.

## Implications of Governance in Vietnam on CoST

The public procurement portal will have an implication on the implementation of CoST in Vietnam. Given the supposed need for public officials to supplement their meager salaries with informal payments, the portal would put that source of income at risk. Finding alternative sources of income may be one credible core reason why the development of the portal has taken so long.

One substantial challenge for CoST to overcome is how to incentivise public officials to comply rather than defect. As discussed earlier, lowest-level public sector salaries are almost on the poverty line. As such, informal payments are a key source of income for public officials. Assuming that CoST's public infrastructure transparency programme seeks to ultimately reduce informal payments, without considering forgone income, CoST is not likely to succeed.

A group of people is walking on a modern, elevated pedestrian bridge or walkway. The bridge has a light-colored wooden deck and metal railings. The background is filled with dense, vibrant green foliage, suggesting a park or a natural setting. The overall atmosphere is bright and airy.

***Public infrastructure  
transparency policy and  
practice***

# Public infrastructure transparency policy and practice

## *Existing Framework for Transparency*

In the Open Budget Survey 2015 (International Budget Partnership, 2016), Vietnam was one of the worst among the ASEAN5, achieving a score of just 18/100 on transparency (see Appendix 3). However, Vietnam does do much better when it comes to budget oversight by legislature (61/100) and by auditors (75/100). Perhaps in recognition of these poor ratings, Vietnam has begun to work with international partners to strengthen its transparency framework. These include:

- **CoST Vietnam** – Vietnam has been a member of CoST since 2008, when it joined the initiative as part of its pilot programme;
- **Open Contracting Partnership (OCP)** – In 2016, Vietnam agreed to implement the Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS), with the partnership being led by Vietnam's Public Procurement Agency. Furthermore, the OCP launched a World Bank-sponsored reporting platform for Vietnam last year which was scheduled to go live in Autumn 2016;
- **Open Government Partnership** – Vietnam is not yet a member though a workshop was conducted in Vietnam in 2015. However, there has been no commitment to join to date<sup>24</sup>.

Today in Vietnam, there are around 10 laws relevant to disclosure of information (see Appendices 2 and 4). Table 6 (below) summarises the current disclosure requirements, showing that just 57.5% (23 of 40 data points) of the CoST IDS are required to be disclosed proactively by Vietnamese law.<sup>25</sup> The only provisions for reactive disclosure feature in the Anti-corruption law, which covers 32.5% (13 of 40 data points) of the CoST IDS.

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<sup>24</sup> <http://www.opengovpartnership.org/blog/nanda-sihombing/2014/10/27/ogp-asia-pacific-outreach-5-countries>

<sup>25</sup> Note that under the Environmental Law, environmental impact, and land and settlement impact assessments are required to be disclosed proactively however, only basic information needs to be disclosed. The Anti-corruption Law was revised later to require reactive disclosure of detailed information.

**Table 6: Vietnamese Law on Disclosure compared to the CoST IDS<sup>26</sup>**

Project Phase	Information to be disclosed	Required by law/policy	
		Proactive	Upon Request
<b>Date</b>	Last updated		
<b>Project Identification</b>	Reference number	✓	
	Project owner	✓	
	Sector, Subsector		
	Project name	✓	
	Project Location	✓	
	Purpose	✓	
	Project description		✓
<b>Project Preparation</b>	Project Scope (main output)		✓
	Environmental impact	✓	✓
	Land and settlement impact	✓	✓
	Contact details	✓	
	Funding sources	✓	
	Project Budget	✓	
	Project budget approval date		✓
<b>Project Completion</b>	Project status (current)		✓
	Completion cost (projected)		
	Completion date (projected)		
	Project Scope at completion (projected)		
	Reasons for project changes		✓
	Reference to audit and evaluation reports	✓	
Contract Phase	Information to be disclosed	Required by law/policy	
		Proactive	Upon Request
<b>Date</b>	Last updated		
<b>Procurement</b>	Procuring entity	✓	
	Procuring entity contact details	✓	
	Procurement process	✓	
	Contract type	✓	
	Contract status (current)	✓	
	Number of firms tendering	x	
	Cost estimate	✓	
	Contract administrative entity	✓	
	Contract title	✓	
	Contract firm(s)	✓	
	Contract price	✓	
	Contract scope of work	✓	
	Contract start date and contract period (duration)	✓	
	<b>Implementation</b>	Variation to contract price	x
Escalation of contract price		x	✓
Variation to contract duration		x	✓
Variation to contract scope		x	✓
Reasons for price changes		x	✓
Reasons for scope and duration changes		x	✓
<b>Total # of data points disclosed</b>		23	13
<b>Percentage of data points disclosed</b>		57.5%	32.5%

	Required by Law of procurement (ref.43/2013/QH13) and related decree (ref 63/2014/ND-CP).
	Required by revised law of anti-corruption (ref. 27/2012/QH13) and related decree (ref.
	Required by law of environment protection (ref. 55/2014/QH13) and the related decree (ref.
	Required by law of state audit (ref. 81/2015/QH13) and law of state inspection (ref.

<sup>26</sup> Please note, this Table does not reflect the Access to Information Law that will come into force in 2018.

Based on the current legal requirements to disclose information, there is no single source where one can find all the information across the different phases of a project's lifecycle. Below are the five existing channels for disclosure:

1. Workshops;
2. PMU offices;
3. People's Committees;
4. Construction sites; and
5. Press releases.

Until the eProcurement portal comes into effect in 2019 (as covered in Chapter 4), no public body is yet obliged to disclose information online. The portal was designed to manage 100% of public procurement by 2025 (VN Economic Times, 2016). At present, a pilot site can be viewed publicly however, its functionality remains limited. For example, the details of only five projects are shown at any one time which automatically refresh when new projects are uploaded. This presents an opportunity for CoST's IDS and its disclosure processes.

### ***Access to Information Law***

In March/April 2016, the NA passed Vietnam's first Access to Information Law (AIL), which comes into force on the 1<sup>st</sup> July 2018 (Towards Transparency, 2016). Vietnam is the third country in SEA after Thailand (1997) and Indonesia (2008) to pass an AIL (VN Express, 2016e). At present, only the Vietnamese language version is available on the Ministry of Justice (2016) website.

It is early days for the new law however, several organisations have criticised the AIL quite strongly. Among them is Towards Transparency (TT), a local NGO<sup>27</sup> falling under Transparency International (TI) that promotes transparency in Vietnam, which offers the following key comments:

- Access will be restricted to individual citizens only so groups, organisations or non-citizens cannot use retrieved data;
- Some information that may put the interests of the State, national defence and security, social security and the health of the community at risk will be restricted access;
- Furthermore, only selected individuals who need to access information as a matter of duty are permitted to access information pertaining to politics, national security and defence, foreign and economic policy;
- Citizens are prohibited from providing or using information which may be used against the State; and
- The law fails to address accessibility needs for the disabled (e.g. braille, hard-of-hearing recordings), ethnic minority groups (translations), Vietnamese diaspora, and the illiterate

The Centre for Law and Democracy Canada, Access Info Europe, and Towards Transparency evaluated the draft and final AIL against the Right to Information Legislation (RTI) Rating. They gave Vietnam's AIL a score of 59/150, placing Vietnam 93<sup>rd</sup> of 102 countries evaluated (Ibid.). For comparison, Thailand's RTI score was 76/150 and Indonesia's was 101/150 (RTI, 2016). A breakdown of the Vietnam RTI score can be found in Table 7 below.

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<sup>27</sup> A complete list of registered NGOs in Vietnam can be found via the following link <http://www.ngocentre.org.vn/ingodirectory>

**Table 7: RTI Evaluation Score of Vietnam’s Access to Information Law**

Section	Max points	Score for Draft of Law on Access to Information (8/2015)	Final Score for official Law on Access to Information (4/2016)
1. Right of Access	6	2	3
2. Scope	30	16	16
3. Requesting Procedures	30	12	16
4. Exceptions and Refusals	30	10	14
5. Appeals	30	8	9
6. Sanctions and Protections	8	2	2
7. Promotional Measures	16	9	8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>68</b>

Source: Towards Transparency (2016)

Vietnam’s AIL does not do too well across all indicators of the RTI score. However, there was notable improvement in the RTI score of the final version of the AIL compared to the draft. No further information is available on the reasons why some of TT’s recommendations were omitted from the final draft of the AIL.

## Recommendation 9

There are various existing laws and requirements for transparency in Vietnam. However, Vietnam lacks a clear/comprehensive national data standard. Vietnam’s transparency requirements are also less stringent than CoST IDS requirements. This is an excellent opportunity for CoST to strengthen transparency by expanding national disclosure requirements and improving compliance.

There are 3 promising entry points for CoST:

- i. Integrating CoST into the AIL before it comes into force in mid-2018. CoST should collaborate with TT on their existing efforts to improve the AIL and rights to information;
- ii. Working with MPI and KOICA to integrate CoST IDS into the eProcurement Portal before it is launched in 2019. This will serve as the single window for disclosure across project lifecycles, from inception to delivery of the asset;
- iii. Integrating the CoST IDS, as the Infrastructure Extension to OCP’s OCDS.

## Compliance with transparency requirements


In this final section of the study, 20 public infrastructure projects were assessed to measure their compliance with both national requirements and the CoST IDS. As discussed in the methodology, a sample was taken that is representative of the proportion of investment by the top five ministries. Due to the fact that the AIL will not come into force until 2018, and given the sensitivity around data usage, only compliance with proactive disclosure requirements was assessed in this study.

As such, ten projects were drawn randomly from the MOT, four from MARD, two from MOH, two from MOC, and one from the Hanoi DOET. An analysis of the results from the analysis of these 20 public infrastructure projects can be found below. Please refer to Appendix 5 for a complete breakdown of the results; additional project information on each of the 20 sample projects can also be found in Appendix 6.

An additional assessment of six prominent public infrastructure projects in Vietnam was also made. These projects were selected upon the recommendation of the public infrastructure specialist at the FCO in Vietnam due to the high value of investment and their strategic importance for development.

### *Level of disclosure compliance*

**Figure 8: Percentage compliance with legal requirements and CoST IDS**



Source: Sample data



From the 20 projects sampled, Figure 8 above shows that the average level of compliance across five ministries with both legal and CoST IDS requirements. At the project level, the average compliance rate with legal requirements is 39% whilst the compliance rate with the CoST IDS is 32%. Please see Appendix 5 for more details on the number of data points disclosed for each project.

Figure 8 also shows that the MOT did considerably better than others, with 40% compliance with the CoST IDS and 53% compliance with legal requirements. This is important because the MOT is responsible for the largest portion of development investment. In theory, MARD could have had the highest compliance rate given that its website contains more fields relevant to legal requirements and the CoST IDS. However, the sample revealed that many of these fields were not completed and information was missing.

The MOH were least compliant, with an average rate of just 11% with legal requirements and 6% with the CoST IDS. This is not surprising as the platform only features six out of the 40 CoST IDS data points and even then, data was missing.

Figure 9 below shows the average percentage of compliance according to each of the 40 data points in the CoST IDS. As mentioned, just 23 of the 40 data points (57.5%) are legally required for proactive disclosure. In general, the project phase data points had a higher rate of disclosure compliance than those in the contract phase, as indicated by the averages, 37 and 25 respectively.<sup>28</sup>


However, although required by law, none of the sample projects disclosed environmental or land and settlement impact assessments (see Table 6 above). It is also interesting to note that none of the projects featured information about the number of firms that participated in the tender process. This information is not required by law but it does form part of the CoST IDS as it is an important indicator of market competitiveness.

Something as simple as a unique reference number was only provided in a third of projects sampled. On the whole, it was as though the PEs updated the project information once and never returned to it, which would explain the lack of compliance. However, the information that is legally required to be proactively disclosed could theoretically be disclosed after procurement but prior to construction.

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<sup>28</sup> In measuring the overall compliance with the CoST IDS, 'Date' (which appears in both the Project and Contract phase) is only counted once; this totals 40 data points. However, when measuring compliance in the individual phases (Project vs. Contract), 'Date' is counted as one data point in each phase.

Figure 9: Percentage of compliance with 40 CoST IDS Datapoints



## Overall usability of ministry webpages

In general, one common area that needs to be improved is the usability of Ministry websites and in particular, their project listings. Users should be able to sort and filter based on at least three to five key data points. There was not even a search tool within the project lists that could allow a user to find a specific project without knowing its exact name.

Another area for improvement is the presentation of individual project data itself. There is no standardisation in the presentation of data across ministries. In the case of the MOH, only six tabulated data points existed in a list format. See the screenshot in Figure 10 below.

Figure 10: MOH Project Information

STT	Tên dự án	Thời gian bắt đầu	Thời gian kết thúc	Nguồn vốn	Loại tài trợ	Kinh phí dự án
1	Nâng cao năng lực phòng, chống HIV/AIDS khu vực Tiểu vùng Mê Kông mở rộng	01/01/2013	01/12/2017			
2	Nâng cao năng lực quản lý an toàn vệ sinh thực phẩm trong thương mại Tiểu vùng Mê Kông mở rộng	01/04/2013	01/06/2018			
3	Phòng chống bệnh truyền nhiễm khu vực tiểu vùng sông Mê Kông giai đoạn 2	01/05/2011	01/12/2015			
4	Chương trình Phát triển nguồn nhân lực y tế	01/01/2011	01/06/2016			
5	Hỗ trợ y tế vùng Duyên Hải Nam Trung Bộ	01/03/2009	01/06/2014			
6	Giáo dục và đào tạo nhân lực y tế phục vụ cải cách hệ thống y tế	01/01/2014	01/01/2020			
7	HTKT nâng cao năng lực tuyên truyền và cung cấp dịch vụ vệ sinh môi trường biển vùng.	01/06/2013	01/06/2016			
8	Hỗ trợ y tế các tỉnh vùng Đông Bắc bộ và Đông bằng Sông Hồng	01/09/2013	01/09/2018			
9	Hỗ trợ xử lý chất thải bệnh viện	01/06/2011	01/08/2017			
10	Hỗ trợ y tế các tỉnh Bắc Trung Bộ	01/01/2010	01/08/2016			
11	Hỗ trợ hệ thống v tế - Quy Toàn cầu	01/01/2012	01/12/2016	Quy Toàn	KHL	86,982,912

The MOC and DOET were arguably the worst in terms of format of information, which appeared to have been copied and pasted from a press release. See Figure 11 and 12 below.

Figure 11: MOC Project Information

**BỘ XÂY DỰNG**  
NƯỚC CỘNG HÒA XÃ HỘI CHỦ NGHĨA VIỆT NAM

**HẠ TẦNG KỸ THUẬT ĐÔ THỊ**

Trang chủ | Giới thiệu | Sơ đồ công | Thư điện tử | Danh bạ | Thư bạn đọc | Liên hệ | XDNET | English | Rss | Tìm kiếm

**Bổ trợ vốn đối ứng cho dự án phát triển đô thị vừa và nhỏ miền Trung do ADB tài trợ**

1/5/12 3:07 PM

Xem với cỡ chữ **T** | Gửi bài viết email | In bài viết | Đọc bài viết

Ngày 30/12, Bộ Xây dựng đã có công văn 2302/BXD-HTKT gửi Ủy ban Nhân dân các tỉnh: Phú Yên, Khánh Hòa, Ninh Thuận, Bình Thuận, Đắk Nông về việc bổ trợ vốn đối ứng cho dự án phát triển đô thị vừa và nhỏ miền Trung do ADB tài trợ.

Dự án phát triển đô thị vừa và nhỏ miền Trung do Ngân hàng Phát triển Châu Á tài trợ (khoản vay ADB số 2272-VIE(SF)) đang được triển khai thực hiện tại 5 tỉnh: Phú Yên, Khánh Hòa, Ninh Thuận, Bình Thuận và Đắk Nông. Đến nay, công tác đầu thầu các gói thầu xây lắp của dự án đã hoàn thành. Ban quản lý dự án các tỉnh đã ký kết hợp đồng và đang tổ chức thực hiện hợp đồng. Theo dự kiến, các hợp đồng này sẽ được thực hiện trong thời gian tối đa là 24 tháng để đảm bảo đáp ứng thời hạn hoàn thành dự án vào ngày 31/12/2013.

Do dự án này đã được ADB gia hạn một lần và sẽ không được gia hạn thêm nên Phối đoàn xem xét vốn vay của ADB trong chuyển công tác từ ngày 5/7/2011 đã yêu cầu các tỉnh cần nỗ lực đẩy nhanh tiến độ thi công các hợp đồng xây lắp để có thể hoàn thành chậm nhất vào ngày 31/12/2013. Theo quy định của Hiệp định dự án, các hợp đồng xây lắp của dự án sẽ được chi trả đồng thời từ 2 nguồn: nguồn vốn ADB và vốn đối ứng. ADB sẽ chỉ giải ngân nguồn vốn tài trợ khi nguồn vốn đối ứng của các hợp đồng được giải ngân tương ứng. Vì vậy, việc bổ trợ và kịp thời nguồn vốn đối ứng của các tỉnh trong quá trình thực hiện dự án là yếu tố quan trọng để các hợp đồng có thể hoàn thành theo đúng thời hạn đã cam kết.

Trung tâm Thông tin  
Nguồn: Công văn 2302/BXD-HTKT.

**CÔNG THÀNH PHẦN**

- Vật liệu xây dựng
- Thanh tra xây dựng
- Hạ tầng kỹ thuật Đô thị
- Phát triển đô thị
- Nhà ở và thị trường BĐS
- Pháp luật xây dựng
- Chất lượng công trình Xây dựng
- Quy hoạch - Kiến trúc
- Kinh tế Xây dựng
- Hoạt động xây dựng

**LIÊN KẾT WEBSITE**

..... Lựa chọn .....

Tài liệu đính kèm bài viết  
(Cong van 2302.doc) [Tải về](#)

Figure 12: DOET Project Information

The screenshot shows the website for the Hanoi Education & Training Sector. The header includes the logo of Hanoi Education & Training Sector and navigation links for various departments. The main content area features a news item titled "Thẩm định thiết kế, dự toán dự án xây dựng trường THPT Trần Nhân Tông" (Design and budget approval for the construction of Tran Nhan Tong High School). The article provides details about the project, including the location and the scope of work.

THÔNG TIN CHUNG		TIN HOẠT ĐỘNG
Tin tức - sự kiện	Cập nhật : 8:42 20/8/2015	Lượt xem : 1244
Phòng ban Sở	<b>Thẩm định thiết kế, dự toán dự án xây dựng trường THPT Trần Nhân Tông</b>	
Hợp tác quốc tế		
Thành tựu	Sở Xây dựng Hà Nội đã ký văn bản số 3414/SXD-TĐ chấp thuận kết quả thẩm định thiết kế bản vẽ thi công và dự toán công trình xây dựng, cải tạo trường THPT Trần Nhân Tông tại số 15 phố Hương Viên, phường Đồng Nhân, quận Hai Bà Trưng, gồm các hạng mục chủ yếu sau:	
Chuyên đề GD&ĐT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Phá dỡ nhà học, nhà hiệu bộ cũ đã xuống cấp, xây dựng nhà học và hiệu bộ cao 6 tầng + 01 tầng áp mái.</li> <li>- Xây dựng hạ tầng kỹ thuật: Sân vườn, tường rào, nhà bảo vệ, trạm bơm, PCCC, cải tạo nhà học 4 tầng còn lại, bổ sung trang thiết bị.</li> </ul>	
Gương mặt cơ sở	Trên cơ sở văn bản thẩm định của Sở Xây dựng, Sở Giáo dục và Đào tạo đã hoàn tất hồ sơ trình UBND Thành phố phê duyệt thiết kế bản vẽ thi công và dự toán cho dự án, tạo điều kiện giúp trường hoàn thành thủ tục ghi vốn và triển khai thi công vào năm 2016.	
Văn hóa văn nghệ		
Bạn có biết - cần biết		
Thi & Tuyển Sinh		

Tác giả: Ban QLDA

The ministry in the sample with the best presentational format was MARD, which provided tabs under the main project information table that linked to additional documents and fund disbursement charts. See Figure 13 below.

Figure 13: MARC Project Information

Translate From: Vietnamese To: English View: Translation Original

Hello: Guest | Login

**HỆ THỐNG QUẢN LÝ CÁC DỰ ÁN ĐẦU TƯ THUỘC BỘ NÔNG NGHIỆP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN NÔNG THÔN**

Home page Introduce View project Extract reports DA has not reported Guide

**Project information**

Name of project Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation  
 Project code 7543062  
 Reporting Entity College mechanization and irrigation  
 Performance venues Dong Nai  
 Approval decision 4391  
 Date of approval 30/10/2015  
 The implementation phase 2016 - 2020  
 total investment 65000 million  
 Status Processing  
 Annunciator Tran Thi Hanh

Project Description year delivery plan monthly Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation

Year implemented 2016

**Tình hình thực hiện các dự án đầu tư của Bộ năm 2016**

	01/2016	02/2016	03/2016	04/2016	05/2016	06/2016	07/2016	08/2016	09/2016
Thực hiện	0	0	0	0	507	693	682	1706	9223
Giải ngân	0	0	0	0	507	693	682	1706	9223

Name of project	Monthly report	Implemented capital (million)	Disbursements (million)	Attachments
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	01/2016	0	0	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	02/2016	0	0	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	03/2016	0	0	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	04/2016	0	0	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	05/2016	507	507	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	06/2016	186	186	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	07/2016	189	189	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	08/2016	824	824	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	09/2016	7517	7517	
<b>Total:</b>		<b>9223</b>	<b>9223</b>	

It is possible that all of the CoST IDS is captured within Ministries and provincial administrations, and may even be published proactively. However, despite the concerted effort of this research, this is the extent of information that has been found. A key requirement of transparency is accessibility so information, even if published, is useless if an average citizen cannot locate it.

On the whole regarding accessibility of disclosed data, CoST could help PEs to align the usability and formats of their disclosed public infrastructure information with international standards. With some simple adjustments, PEs could advance considerably in terms of online disclosure.

## Recommendation 10

CoST should appoint MOT and MARD as CoST Champions to advocate for greater transparency in public infrastructure. MOT was the top performer in terms for disclosure compliance and MARD has the greatest potential in terms of its online disclosure requirements. This would reward good behaviour and demonstrate to other PEs that greater transparency is achievable.

### ***Six Flagship Projects:***

As mentioned in the methodology, six flagship projects were identified by the FCO in Vietnam. An analysis of compliance is detailed below.

#### (i) Hanoi Metro System

The urban railway or metro in Hanoi is one component of a broader plan to urban upgrade of Hanoi's infrastructure (NA, 2011). The aim of the metro system is to alleviate pressure on the road infrastructure in Hanoi and establish better connections between Hanoi and its periphery.

The Hanoi Metro Company was set up and given a 100-year license to operate the metro network (Hanoi Metro Company, 2016a), which will eventually feature eight lines as detailed in Figure 14 (below).

Figure 14: Hanoi's Metro System Plan



Source: Hanoi Metro Company (2016b)

**Table 8: Details of Current Metro Projects in Hanoi**


Line #	1	2A	2	3
Route	Yen Vien – Ngoc Hoi	Cat Linh – Ha Dong	Nam Thang Long – Tran Hung Dao	Nhon – Hanoi Railway Station
Length (km)	25	13.1	11.5	12.5
Project Owner	Railway Project Management department, MOT		Hanoi Urban Railway Management, Hanoi People's Committee	
Funder (ODA)	Japan	China	Japan	France (ADB, AFD, EIB)
Investment (VND/US\$)	VND 19.5 tn / US\$870 mn with VND 14 tn / US\$624.7 mn from JICA and rest “counterpart funds” (VN Express, 2015)	VND 8.7 tn / US\$388.2 mn (HURM, 2013a)	Originally, VND 19.6 tn / US\$874.6 mn (VND 16.5 tn / US\$736.2 mn from JBIC) but to revised to VND 51.8 tn / US\$2.3 bn (HURM, 2012a)	VND 3 tn / US\$133.9 mn (HURM, 2013b)
# Bidding Packages	Not yet defined	-	Not yet defined	9 (5 construction & 4 equipment)
Contractor/s	-	China Railway 6th Bureau Group (Vietnam Investment Review, 2016); Thang Long Construction Corporation (HURM, 2013a)	OC Consulting Consortium & two unnamed Vietnamese Consulting firms (HURM, 2012b)	Systra (Consulting component, HURM, 2013b); POSCO E&C (construction package # unknown, HURM, 2013c); MPC (construction package #5, HURM, 2013d); Colas Rail SA (construction package #7, HURM, 2016)
Project Status	Technical design in process	Construction of the depot, sky rail, and raised stations in process	Bidding plan approved and technical design in process	Construction of the depot, sky & underground rail, and raised stations in process
Completion Date	2020	2016	2019	2018
Compliance with CoST IDS/Legal requirements (%)	55% / 61%	58% / 65%	58% / 65%	58% / 65%

Source: Hanoi Metro Company (2016b) unless otherwise specified



The Hanoi Metro Company website (See Figure 15 below) mainly provides information for future passengers on how to use the metro system but there are two pages that present project information on the current status of the metro system (see Table 8 above). However, there is no evidence of project Line 1 and 2A projects in the MOT’s list of public infrastructure projects.

**Figure 15: Hanoi Metro Company Website Home Page**



Source: Hanoi Metro Company (2016b)

At present, four projects on three of the eight metro lines are currently active. All four projects are funded by a handful of bilateral/multilateral ODA institutions and are divided between two different project owners/PEs, the MOT and Hanoi People’s Committee. Each project is split into around 8 packages, each of which will be assigned to a contractor for either construction or provision of equipment. The bidding process is not explicitly clear but evidence suggests international competitive bidding.

The level of compliance is above par with the sample of 20 projects, with an average compliance with the CoST IDS of around 57%, and 64% with respect to the current proactive disclosure law. See Figure 16 below for some examples of proactive disclosure under the Hanoi metro construction sites.

**64%**  
compliance on average with  
legal requirements for  
proactive disclosure

Figure 16: Photos of Proactive Disclosure from the Hanoi Metro Construction Sites



Top: Line 2A project information (Project owner/PE, investors, supervisory consultant, contractor, subcontractors); Below left: Line 3 PE name and logo; Bottom right: Line 3 project information (Project owner/PE, overseas funders, supervisory consultant, technical specifications)



According to the Hanoi Metro Company (2016b) website, Line 2A was expected to be completed by the end of 2016. At the time of writing this report, this is highly unlikely as the China Railway 6<sup>th</sup> Bureau Group has reported financial problems and is trying to raise funds to pay its subcontractors (Vietnam Investment Review, 2016). There were also structural faults that had created previous setbacks earlier on (Ibid.).

The delays on several Hanoi Metro project lines are reportedly due to issues with resettlement and compensation (The Guardian, 2016). There is a lack of an overarching transport authority to streamline construction efforts (Ibid.). This is particularly important for Line 2 and Line 2A, which is managed by two separate PEs. However, Hanoi Urban Railway Management (HURM) (2013d) places responsibility for the delays on the contractor, specifically in relation to the construction of package 5 on Line 3.

(ii) Ho Chi Minh City Metro System

The urban railway or metro in Ho Chi Minh city (HCM) has the same aim as that of the Hanoi metro system, to alleviate pressure on the road networks and connect HCM with satellite cities. It forms part of a 2013 master plan to upgrade HCM transport system by 2020 (MAUR, 2013).

The project owner/PE is the HCM Urban Railway Management Authority (MAUR), which exists within the HCM People’s Committee. Unlike in Hanoi, there is just one PE. Unfortunately, the website<sup>29</sup> of the HCM Urban Railway Management Authority was not functioning at the time of writing of this report.

The HCM metro system will be comprised of six lines, five of which are currently at different stages of implementation. Furthermore, Line 1, 2 and 5 have secured funding and are either at the pre-/feasibility study or construction phases (MAUR, 2016). See Figure 17 below for a map of the HCM metro and some photos of on-site disclosure, and Table 9 below for project information.

Figure 17: HCM’s Metro System Plan (Unofficial) & On-Site Disclosure



Source: Top Left Saigoneer (2016)

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.hcmc-maur.vn>

**Table 9: Details of Current Metro Projects in HCM**


Line #	1	2	3a	3b	4	4b	5	6
<b>Route</b>	Ben Thanh – Suoi Tien	Tay Bac Urban – Thu Thiem	Ben Thanh – Tan Kien Depot	Cong Hoa – Hiep Binh Phuoc	Thanh Xuan – Hiep Phuoc Urban Area	Gia Dinh Park – Lang Cha Ca	New Can Giuoc Terminal – Saigon Bridge	Ba Queo – Phu Lam Roundabout
<b>Length (km)</b>	19.7km	48km	19.8km	12.2km	35.8km	3.2km	23.4km	5.6km
<b>Project Owner</b>	MAUR							
<b>Funder (ODA)</b>	JICA and the HCM People’s Committee (Saigoneer, 2016)	HCM People’s Committee, ADB, EIB, KfW	JICA, HCM People’s Committee		TBC	TBC	Central Budget (30%), Spanish Government, ADB, EIB, KfW	TBC
<b>Investment (VND/US\$)</b>	VND 54 tn / US\$2.4 bn (with VND 49 tn US\$2.2 bn from JICA and remainder by the HCM People’s Committee, Saigoneer, 2016)	VND 47 tn / US\$2.1 bn	VND tn / US\$2 bn (JICA US\$3 bn for Line 3A and 3B)	VND 42.5 tn / US\$1.9 bn (JICA US\$3 bn for Line 3A and 3B)	VND 101 tn / US\$4.5 bn (may include line 4b)	VND 25 tn / US\$1.1 bn	VND 101 tn / US\$4.5 bn	VND 25.9 tn / US\$1.3 bn
<b># Bidding Packages</b>	5	3	2	-	-	-	2	2
<b>Contractor/s</b>	Sumitomo Corporation; the Civil Engineering Construction	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

	Corporation No. 6 (CIENCO 6) of the MOT (HCM Metro Line 1, 2016); Hitachi; O&M (MAUR, 2016)							
<b>Project Status</b>	Under construction	Bidding underway (package 1), Pre-feasibility study underway (package 2 and 3)	HCM People's Committee approved design, investment to be secured in 2017	HCM People's Committee approved design, landmark profiles handed over to HCM People's Committee for planning management	Feasibility study submitted for approval, seeking investment	Korean Export-Import Bank provided technical assistance for pre-/feasibility study (underway)	Bidding underway (package 1), applying for Central Budget funding but KOICA-sponsored feasibility study complete (package 2)	Seeking funding
<b>Completion Date</b>	2020	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Compliance with CoST IDS/Legal requirements (%)</b>	80% / 83%	73% / 65%	73% / 61%	73% / 61%	75% / 65%	73% / 65%	73% / 65%	76% / 65%
<b>Source (unless otherwise specified)</b>	MAUR (2016)							

Source: Multiple

The MAUR website is very good, serving as a single source of information for this project, featuring both project information as well as investment opportunities (see Figure 18 below). Moreover, the website is available in English. It far outperforms the Hanoi Metro Company's website although the purpose of the two sites may differ.

**Figure 18: MAUR Web Page in English**



Source: MAUR (2016)

By means of compliance, MAUR (2016) achieved an average of 74% against the CoST IDS and 66% versus the laws on proactive disclosure (see Table 9 above)<sup>30</sup>. This is on par with MAUR counterparts in Hanoi, the Hanoi Metro Company. It should be noted however, that the format of the MAUR website is not tabular, as is the case with most project disclosure websites in this sample.

**66%**  
compliance on average with  
legal requirements for  
proactive disclosure

### (iii) North-South High-Speed Rail

The existing railway from Hanoi to HCM is dated and needs upgrading. The North-South high-speed rail project is a long-term project that has been developed to address this issue. It was conceived around 2010, with partial service scheduled to be delivered by 2030 and complete service in operation by 2050 (VNRA, 2016). The project owner is the MOT, which is in the process of conducting a pre-feasibility study. It is very early days for this project and funding partners and a PMU are yet to be identified. Therefore, there is very little information available at this stage. However, press releases suggest that the project will be largely state-owned with

<sup>30</sup> Compliance is strong despite the fact that five of the six HCM metro lines are at a phase prior to contractor selection. As these metro lines progress, the compliance may be affected. For example, Line 1 is already at the Contractor selection phase and therefore scored the highest compliance rate.

only 0.7% private ownership. Given the early stage of this project's development, it was not possible to evaluate proactive disclosure compliance.

(iv) Long Thanh International Airport, Dong Nai

**Figure 19: Aerial Design of Long Thanh International Airport**



Source: ADPI (2010)

Tan Son Nhat airport in HCM was built by the Americans some 30 years ago and has now been enveloped by urban development, leaving little room for expansion. As a result, the NA has developed a plan to build Vietnam's largest airport, Long Thanh, which is around 40km East of HCM. It is envisaged that Long Thanh International Airport will make HCM a regional aviation hub, accommodating one hundred million passengers and five million tonnes of cargo per year (ADPI, 2010).

ADPI, a French airport architecture and engineering company, along with Japan Airports Consultants developed the Master Plan for Long Thanh airport in 2010, estimating the cost of construction at US\$6 billion. Construction was due to start in 2018, with completion foreseen by 2020 (Ibid.). However, delays relating to compliance with the procedures stipulated by the National Assembly Economic Committee have meant that construction may begin in 2030 (Vietnam News, 2016c).

Land acquisition, land clearance, and resettlement alone are expected to take three years. Project approval will only come after the PM receives budget approval for resettlement from the NA. This would mean amending the Socio-economic development plan for 2016-2020 (Ibid.). The aim is to present the project in the first meeting of the NA in 2018 to secure approval and launch the project in 2018.

Revised projections of total investment cost have increased almost threefold on ADPI's original estimate, now totaling US\$16 billion (Ibid.). It is said that project delays are a key

factor for the cost escalation. The MOT is managing the project however, a PMU is yet to be established for when the project is approved. Given the early stage of this project's development, there is little information available at this time and it was not possible to evaluate proactive disclosure compliance.


(v) Nghi Son 2 Power Plant, Thanh Hoa

The 1,200 MW super-critical thermal coal power plant project at Nghi Son will provide super-efficient and environmentally-friendly electricity to the North of Vietnam. Issued for international tender in 2008, Nghi Son 2 was Vietnam's first international tender in the energy sector (Marubeni Corporation, 2013). In 2013, the competitive BOT tender with a duration of 25 years was awarded to Marubeni Corporation and Korea Electric Power Corporation.

Both companies own a 50% shareholding in the project and will operate under the direction of the Department of Energy, Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) and the state-owned national grid operator, Vietnam Electricity Holding Company (EVN), which serve as the project owners/PE (VN Express, 2013). The first Nghi Son power plant has established a website, as shown in Figure 20 below, however, a website for Nghi Son 2 is yet to be available.



Figure 20: Nghi Son 1 Power Plant Web Page



Source: <http://nghison1.evn.vn>

Financing will be provided by the Japan Bank of International Cooperation and the Export-Import Bank of Korea (Marubeni Corporation, 2013). The project contract is valued at US\$2.3 billion and was initially expected to be operational by 2018 (VIR, 2015). However, construction on the Nghi Son Economic Zone in Thanh Hoa province only started in late 2015 and the reasons for this delay are unknown. The first of two turbines is now expected to come online by 2019 and the second by 2020.

As mentioned above, there is currently no dedicated project page for Nghi Son 2, unlike Nghi Son 1. The project information on the MOIT website only reports on the bidding format (pre-selection) and basic project information; no information exists on the EVN website. Press releases are the main sources of the information.

When combining the information from the three sources mentioned above, the project achieves just 58% compliance with the CoST IDS but a solid 78% compliance with the laws on proactive disclosure. This places Nghi Son 2 first among the six flagship public infrastructure projects with regards to compliance with legal requirements.

**78%**  
compliance on average with  
legal requirements for  
proactive disclosure

Its shortcomings were largely due to text formatting compared to tabular formatting. As a result, most CoST IDS data points related to the project completion and implementation were missing.<sup>31</sup>

(vi) Duyen Hai Power Plants, Tra Vinh.

Duyen Hai power complex is a multi-billion dollar project, comprised of three power plants in the southern province of Tra Vinh. The power complex aims to meet the electricity needs of the expanding cities in the South of Vietnam (VOV, 2016).

**58%**  
compliance on average with  
legal requirements for  
proactive disclosure

Table 10 below shows the key project details. On average, the Duyen Hai power complex project information was 57% compliant with the CoST IDS and 58% compliance with legal requirements. EVN Power Generation Corporation 1 does not yet provide information via a single source, and as such, all of the information in Table 10 was sourced from text-based

press releases. Overall, among the six flagship projects with information disclosed, Duyen Hai power complex performs the worst. There were even one- to two-year delays for plants 3 and 3 (extension), which have gone unexplained.

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<sup>31</sup> Where data fields have been left blank, this does not necessarily mean non-compliance. It could mean that there was no information to enter; for example, a project may not have had any adjustment in projected cost or scope.

**Table 10: Details of the Duyen Hai Power Complex**

<b>Plant #</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3 (Extension)</b>
<b>Generation Capacity (MW)</b>	1,245	1,200	1,245	660
<b># of Turbines</b>	2	2	2	-
<b>Project Owner</b>	EVN Power Generation Corporation 1	Department of Energy, MOIT	EVN Power Generation Corporation 1 (Tra Vinh Portal, 2012)	EVN Power Generation Corporation 1
<b>Funder</b>		Teknik Janakuasa Group (Malaysia; Vietnam Plus, 2016)	-	85% from “domestic and foreign commercial loans”
<b>Investment (VND/US\$)</b>	VND 111.4 tn / US\$5 bn	VND 44.6 tn / US\$2.2 bn	VND 28.4 bn / US\$1.3 bn	VND 22.7 tn / US\$1.1 bn
<b>Contractor/s</b>	-	Teknik Janakuasa Group (Malaysia)	Chengda-Dec-Swepdi-Zepc contractor group (China, Tra Vinh Portal, 2012)	Sumitomo Corporation (Japan)
<b>Project Status</b>	Complete	Under construction	Under construction	Under construction
<b>Completion Date</b>	Turbine 1 operational as of 31 <sup>st</sup> January 2015; turbine 2 as of 26 <sup>th</sup> April 2015	2020	Turbine 1 operational as of September 2016 (1-2 years behind schedule); turbine 2 by early 2017	2018 (1-2 years behind schedule; Vietnam News, 2016d)
<b>Compliance with CoST IDS/Legal requirements (%)</b>	55% / 57%	58% / 61%	58% / 57%	58% / 57%
<b>Source</b>	Vietnam News (2016d) unless otherwise specified	Vietnam News (2016d) unless otherwise specified	Vietnam Pictorial (2016)	Vietnam Plus (2014a, 2014b)

Source: Multiple

## Summary of the Six Flagship Projects

Table 11 (below) shows the results of the compliance evaluation for the four flagship projects that currently disclose information.<sup>32</sup>

**Table 11: Six Flagship Projects' Rates of Compliance with the Law**

Flagship Projects with information Disclosed	CoST IDS Compliance	Legal requirement
1. Hanoi Metro System	57%	64%
2. HCM Metro System	<b>74%</b>	66%
5. Nghi Son 2 Power Plant	58%	<b>78%</b>
6. Duyen Hai Power Plants	57%	58%

Disclosure compliance for the four flagship public infrastructure projects is better than that of the 20 projects in the sample by at least ten percentage points (see Appendix 5 for details on the number of data points disclosed for each project). However, it should be noted that part of the difference is due to the variation in the methodology of data collection. The information on the 20 projects was derived from a single source (PE/PMU websites), whereas the information on these four flagship projects was drawn from multiple sources. Furthermore, the six flagship projects were handpicked based on their large size and notable prominence in public discourse, adding to the likelihood of richer data availability.

Line 1 of the HCM Metro System stood out, with 80% compliance with CoST IDS and 83% legal requirement. This slightly improved the average compliance score of the HCM Metro System as a whole, which features data on five other lines. The reason for such high compliance for the HCM Metro System project overall is the MAUR website.<sup>33</sup> This serves as a single source of information for the project, containing project information as well as adverts for existing and future investment opportunities.

Only the Hanoi Metro Company had a similar online platform<sup>34 35</sup>. However, its website had a greater focus on providing future passengers with travel information rather than progress or performance of the project. In the absence of a centralised disclosure platform for all PEs and projects, each PE/PMU should set up dedicated websites for their public infrastructure projects. This would mean that all citizens would have access to project information in one location. Furthermore, it would support a centralised disclosure platform that enables disclosure by multiple PEs of multiple projects in the future, as per Recommendation 9.

Nghi Son 2 performed the best in terms of average compliance with legal requirements. This was mainly due to the availability of a greater number of data sources, which included the contractor website and several news outlets. As mentioned above, EVN has not yet created a dedicated website for Nghi Son 2 which would in theory increase its disclosure compliance.

<sup>32</sup> The North-South High Speed Railway and Long Thanh International Airport projects are in pre-feasibility study phase and PMU/PE have not yet been established. It was therefore not possible to evaluate compliance at this early stage.

<sup>33</sup> <http://maur.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/web/en/introduction>

<sup>34</sup> <http://hanoimetro.net.vn>

<sup>35</sup> Please note, EVN has developed a website that is similar to MAUR (2016) for Nghi Son 1 Power Plant. However, this project was not included in the sample of six flagship projects.

Across all six projects, none of the information disclosed was reported in tabular format even when disclosed by a PE/PMU such as MAUR. It is understandable that news outlets do not publish information in table format; however, PEs/PMUs should be doing so as good practice. As highlighted in Recommendation 9, data standards and disclosure practices are key areas where CoST has a role to play. Other issues related to disclosure included poor accessibility. On some PE/PMU websites, lists of projects spanning ten web pages were not uncommon; simple search tools were either non-existent or dysfunctional.

## Recommendation 11

Although CoST should pursue the development of a centralised/single window platform for information disclosure, this process will take time. In the interim, CoST should also capitalise on existing PE websites to enable/promote disclosure. MARD and MAUR have existing websites for disclosing information, the former already incorporates a number of CoST IDS data points, whilst the latter has a high disclosure compliance rate of 78%. CoST should work with both PEs to improve the usability (formats and accessibility) of their websites.

## Recommendation 12

Compliance with legal requirements and CoST IDS is at best average. CoST should work with PEs to identify any barriers or challenges to disclosure e.g. lack of staff, technical capacity or negligence. In addition, CoST should develop a programme for building capacity of PEs and public officials to disclose information and comply with both legal requirements and CoST IDS.




***Conclusions and  
Recommendations***

## Conclusions and Recommendations

Both the literature review and sample data analyses demonstrate the relevance of CoST, especially in terms of improving data standards and disclosure protocols in Vietnam’s public infrastructure sector. For example, the law requires only 57.5% of CoST IDS data points to be disclosed proactively. Of the PEs assessed, the average compliance rate with legal requirements of the most compliant PE (i.e. MOT) was only 53%; furthermore, in assessing compliance with the CoST IDS, the compliance rate decreases to 40%. A more detailed analysis of the applicability and viability of CoST can be found in the SWOT analysis below.

### SWOT Analysis of CoST in Vietnam



Please find a brief explanation of the points made in the SWOT below. For a fuller understanding, please refer to the main body of the study.

#### Strengths

There are no other NGOs or initiatives focused on infrastructure transparency; therefore, the CoST offering is unique. This means that CoST could benefit from first mover advantage, providing specialist knowledge on infrastructure transparency and drawing on global best practices. Furthermore, it is aligned with other international standards and initiatives. The

added benefit is that unlike broader over-arching transparency initiatives, CoST is a sector-specific transparency initiative with practical implementation tools for improving transparency.

CoST's number one asset in Vietnam at present, its Country Manager who has continued to engage with local stakeholders to refresh the national programme. CoST can leverage the knowledge and network of its Country Manager in Vietnam to win credibility and trust among government stakeholders. CoST can also mobilise its partnerships with organisations, such as OGP and OCP, to coordinate efforts on public sector reform.

### ***Weaknesses***

CoST has only been implemented on a small number of projects; CoST must scale up to include more PEs and more projects in order to reap the benefits of transparency. Given the small scale of implementation, impact evidence is limited. To address this, CoST should share impact evidence and success stories from other countries to make a stronger case for CoST.

CoST also suffers from poor visibility in Vietnam and is not yet well-known at the national level. CoST needs to build trust and improve its credibility in Vietnam. This should be an ongoing effort and could be bolstered by partnering with initiatives such as TT or OCP which are already established in Vietnam.

### ***Opportunities***

The highly centralized system of government in Vietnam could provide an opportunity for CoST; if it is able to secure the commitment at the highest political level, this top-down approach will ensure CoST is mainstreamed across all PEs.

The eProcurement Portal, due to be launched in 2019, could be a ready-made platform for CoST disclosure. However, CoST must act fast with MPI to steer the scope of the portal to incorporate the CoST IDS and enable the creation of a single window for disclosure. CoST should also capitalise on existing transparency laws and regulations to further embed CoST principles within government systems.

From the sample data that was collected and analysed, MARD is the second largest ministry in terms of public infrastructure spending (after the MOT) and has the greatest potential for disclosure compliance given the advanced disclosure parameters of its webpages. However, the average level of compliance is relatively low. CoST should work with MARD to understand the barriers to compliance; if successful, MARD could be a vital champion for CoST.

The final opportunity for CoST is that the anti-corruption agenda is becoming more prevalent in the state-controlled media. The Deputy Prime Minister even addressed the issue, highlighting the specific challenge that the Vietnamese Administration faces with aligning interests within the CPV. This is perhaps a great time for CoST to leverage this by pushing for transparency as a key unifier among the CPV.

Finally, there is an opportunity for CoST to partner with other international initiatives of potential interest to the Leadership including OCP and its World Bank-sponsored data standards work. At the time of writing, OCP was due to work with the government to develop data standards for disclosure.

### ***Threats***

The sheer size, administrative bureaucracy and fragmented nature of the public sector could be a hinderance to the implementation of CoST. Furthermore, informal payments are



embedded in public systems as a means to supplement the very low public sector salaries; this dynamic could deter public officials from complying with disclosure requirements.

The Vietnamese infrastructure sector is dominated by Vietnamese firms that are closely linked to the CPV. Increasing transparency could have a negative effect on this mutually beneficial relationship. CoST should consider partnering with the state-backed VACC in order to build bridges between the CPV and private construction sector. This will require considerable effort as the VACC is not currently active.

These threats could be overcome through partnerships with other international agencies and initiatives on the ground, such as OGP and Swedish International Development Assistance (SIDA). However, it should be noted that some of these actors are also competitors and may reduce the uptake of CoST. For example, the OCP could be considered both an opportunity and a threat. Given that OCP is already working on a project with the Vietnamese Administration, it makes sense for CoST to collaborate with OCP but if CoST is not able to find mutually beneficial grounds for partnership, OCP will become a threat.

The final threat is the substantial reduction in ODA in Vietnam, which is usually the primary source for funding of governance development activities. Furthermore, ODA provides potential for knowledge transfer and entrenching of global standards. With donors winding down ODA to Vietnam, this will make the challenge that CoST faces steeper.

## *Recommendations*

To conclude, below is a list of the twelve recommendations made in this study:

### **Recommendation 1**

For CoST, there are obvious implications for operations. CoST should be based in the administrative capital, Hanoi, which is where most NGOs are based due to the proximity to the public ministries.

However, the bulk of private corporations (construction, financial, logistics, transportation etc.), who are key stakeholders in CoST, are based in the commercial capital, Ho Chi Minh City. Therefore, a budget should be allocated for travel between the two cities.

### **Recommendation 2**

Historically, the CPV generally follows through on any of its decisions including those related to improvements in governance. However, the CPV will do so on its own watch, when the time is right. CoST should consider longer project phasing in Vietnam to ensure sufficient flexibility and accommodate for setbacks, for example delays to any required amendments in policy and legislation.

### **Recommendation 3**

Many PEs at the level of the Provincial People's Committees and below will finance and manage public infrastructure projects autonomously. Therefore, CoST should ensure that the implementation of the national programme is broad enough in scope and includes a plan to engage local PEs in the regions and provinces – not just ministries and central government agencies.

#### **Recommendation 4**

MOC is key to the implementation of CoST. Therefore, CoST must secure explicit endorsement and support from MOC for CoST in Vietnam. Once this commitment is obtained, CoST, in conjunction with MOC, must actively publicise this endorsement to ensure that all stakeholders are aware that CoST has been endorsed by the Vietnamese Leadership at the highest political and executive levels.

#### **Recommendation 5**

CoST must build strategic partnerships with key institutions across stakeholder groups.

For government, this will include MPI, MOT and the State Audit Office among others.

Given the closely intertwined relationship between government and the Vietnamese construction industry, it is also vital to work with the private sector. Given the relative inactivity of the VACC, CoST should partner with the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) to involve and mobilise the private sector on transparency issues. In addition, CoST should, in so far as it is practicable, explore options for involving VACC.

It will also be important for CoST to work with civil society; key recommendations on how to involve civil society actors can be found below.

#### **Recommendation 6**

CoST should work with government, industry and civil society to develop a comprehensive action plan to effect organisational behavioural change within existing institutions. This should include consideration of potential incentives to drive compliance with transparency requirements. For example, CoST could advocate for performance bonuses for public officials/procuring entities that perform well.

#### **Recommendation 7**

Given the limited press freedoms in Vietnam, coupled with the prevalence of state-owned media agencies, CoST implementation must include a programme for building the capacity of the local press and media. This should centre on the importance of integrity and objectivity in reporting and investigative journalism. Media officials must understand their duties and responsibilities in disseminating information to citizens.

#### **Recommendation 8**

Public participation in Vietnam remains constrained and there are few formal channels through which citizens can hold the government to account. CoST should position itself as a safe platform for dialogue and collaboration between government and citizens. In this way, citizens are consulted/engaged on public infrastructure projects and this will go a long way towards building trust in the Vietnamese Leadership.

#### **Recommendation 9**

There are various existing laws and requirements for transparency in Vietnam. However, Vietnam lacks a clear/comprehensive national data standard. Vietnam's transparency requirements are also less stringent than CoST IDS requirements. This is an excellent opportunity for CoST to strengthen transparency by expanding national disclosure requirements and improving compliance. There are 3 promising entry points for CoST:

- i. Integrating CoST into the AIL before it comes into force in mid-2018. CoST should collaborate with TT on their existing efforts to improve the AIL and rights to information;

- ii. Working with MPI and KOICA to integrate CoST IDS into the eProcurement Portal before it is launched in 2019. This will serve as the single window for disclosure across project lifecycles, from inception to delivery of the asset;
- iii. Integrating the CoST IDS, as the Infrastructure Extension to OCP's OCDS.

**Recommendation 10**

CoST should appoint MOT and MARD as CoST Champions to advocate for greater transparency in public infrastructure. MOT was the top performer in terms for disclosure compliance and MARD has the greatest potential in terms of its online disclosure requirements. This would reward good behaviour and demonstrate to other PEs that greater transparency is achievable.

**Recommendation 11**

Although CoST should pursue the development of a centralised/single window platform for information disclosure, this process will take time. In the interim, CoST should also capitalise on existing PE websites to enable/promote disclosure. MARD and MAUR have existing websites for disclosing information, the former already incorporates a number of CoST IDS data points, whilst the latter has a high disclosure compliance rate of 78%. CoST should work with both PEs to improve the usability (formats and accessibility) of their websites.

**Recommendation 12**

Compliance with legal requirements and CoST IDS is at best average. CoST should work with PEs to identify any barriers or challenges to disclosure e.g. lack of staff, technical capacity or negligence. In addition, CoST should develop a programme for building capacity of PEs and public officials to disclose information and comply with both legal requirements and CoST IDS.

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
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# Appendices

## A1. Governance Structure in Vietnam




## A2. Current Disclosure Requirements

Project Stage	Content	Mode of Disclosure
1. Construction planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plan &amp; Maps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conference materials</li> <li>Mass media</li> <li>Print for mass distribution</li> </ul>
2. Project feasibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Approved total investment</li> <li>Land acquisition approval &amp; resettlement solutions</li> <li>Environmental Impact Assessment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conference materials</li> <li>Mass media</li> <li>Commune media (public announcements)</li> <li>People's Committees</li> </ul>
3. Project design	-	-
4. Land acquisition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Land acquisition approval &amp; resettlement solutions</li> <li>Reasons for land acquisition</li> </ul>	People's Committees
5. Tender	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tender plan</li> <li>Invitations, shortlist of bidders, &amp; contractor selection result</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tender review</li> <li>Mass media</li> <li>Tendering website</li> </ul>
6. Construction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Approved project fund</li> <li>Disbursement timeline</li> <li>Audit report</li> <li>Name of project owner</li> <li>Commencement and completion dates</li> <li>Contact details (name, position, address, telephone no.) of executing contractor supervisor, site manager, and design manager</li> <li>Environmental Management Plan</li> <li>---</li> <li>Quality control, structural safety certification, quality conformity of works certification, and construction justice appraisal</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conference materials</li> <li>Commune media (public announcements)</li> <li>People's Committees</li> <li>Sign boards at construction sites</li> <li>---</li> <li>MOC and provincial DOC websites</li> </ul>
7. Project completion and operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Environmental Management Plan</li> <li>Quality control, structural safety certification, quality conformity of works certification, and construction justice appraisal</li> <li>Audit report</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conference materials</li> <li>People's Committees</li> <li>MOC and provincial DOC websites</li> </ul>
8. Operation and maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quality control, structural safety certification, quality conformity of works certification, and construction justice appraisal</li> <li>Maintenance process</li> <li>Construction norms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>People's Committee</li> <li>Print, CDs, and others</li> <li>MOC and provincial DOC websites</li> </ul>


# A3. Open Budget Index Scores in 2010 & 2015 (International Budget Partnership, 2016)

[http://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/2010\\_Rankings.pdf](http://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/2010_Rankings.pdf)



\* All scores in the OBI 2010 are rounded to the nearest whole number, which, in the case of countries scoring slightly above zero, may not reflect that these countries do provide some, albeit extremely limited, budget information. This is the case for Chad and Iraq, which both had OBI 2010 scores of 0.

<http://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBS2015-OBI-Rankings-English.pdf>



The Open Budget Index 2015

Sufficient  
 Extensive (81-100)  
 Substantial (61-80)  
 Limited (41-60)  
 Minimal (21-40)  
 Scant or None (0-20)

## A4. Laws on Disclosure (CoST, 2012)

Stage – Project cycle	Laws of reference									
	Anti-corruption Law No.55/2005/ QH1 and corresponding bylaws	Construction Law No. 16/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Urban Planning Law No.30/2009/ QH12 and corresponding bylaws	Land Law No.13/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Procurement Law No. 61/2005/ QH11and corresponding bylaws	State Budget Law No.01/2002/ QH11and corresponding bylaws	Audit Law No.37/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Decision No.80/2005/QĐ -TTg on Regulation on participatory supervision and relevant documents	Ordinance No. 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on grassroots democracy	Law on Environmental Protection No. 52/2005/ QH11 and bylaw documents
I. Construction planning		<p>- Map for oriented development of regional space; Map for oriented development of regional technical infrastructure system; Regulation on management of regional construction planning</p> <p>- Contents of planning and Regulation on management of rural construction planning..</p> <p>* <u>Mode of disclosure:</u>                      + Conferences to make public construction planning.                      + Display panels, drawings, models at public points, at construction planning management bodies at different levels.                      + Disseminate on mass media.                      + Printed materials for wide distribution.</p>	<p>- Main contents of urban planning design and promulgated Regulation on management of urban planning design and map.</p> <p>* <u>Mode of disclosure:</u>                      + Display drawings, models at urban construction planning bodies at different levels, urban planning information and exhibition centers and in planned areas.                      + Disseminate on mass media.                      + Printed materials for wide dissemination.</p> <p>-----                      ---                      - Regulation on management of urban planning and architecture</p> <p>* <u>Modes of disclosure:</u></p>							

## A4. Laws on Disclosure (CoST, 2012)

Stage – Project cycle	Laws of reference									
	Anti-corruption Law No.55/2005/ QH1 and corresponding bylaws	Construction Law No. 16/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Urban Planning Law No.30/2009/ QH12 and corresponding bylaws	Land Law No.13/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Procurement Law No. 61/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	State Budget Law No.01/2002/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Audit Law No.37/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Decision No.80/2005/QĐ -TTg on Regulation on participatory supervision and relevant documents	Ordinance No. 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on grassroots democracy	Law on Environmental Protection No. 52/2005/ QH11 and bylaw documents
			+ In offices of People's Committees and Planning and Architecture Management Organizations; + On mass media; + Printed materials							
<b>II. Project feasibility study</b>	- Approved and decided construction investment projects must be made public for supervision by the community - Approved total investment fund	- Construction price index				- Approved total investment fund.  * <u>Modes of disclosure:</u> + Offices of agencies, organizations. + Meetings/conferences of agencies, organizations.		- Investment Decision; Project Owner; PMU; progress and schedule; total area and used land area; detailed planning and architecture options; compensation, land acquisition and resettlement solutions; waste treatment and environmental protection solutions. - For projects funded by state budget, disclose: contents of Investment Decision; fund resources and		- Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIA), Decision on approval of EIA report and Work schedule for implementation of EIA requirements. - Signed Environmental Protection Guarantee.  * <u>Modes of disclosure:</u> + Printed materials; + On newspapers;



## A4. Laws on Disclosure (CoST, 2012)

Stage – Project cycle	Laws of reference									
	Anti-corruption Law No.55/2005/ QH1 and corresponding bylaws	Construction Law No. 16/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Urban Planning Law No.30/2009/ QH12 and corresponding bylaws	Land Law No.13/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Procurement Law No. 61/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	State Budget Law No.01/2002/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Audit Law No.37/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Decision No.80/2005/QĐ -TTg on Regulation on participatory supervision and relevant documents	Ordinance No. 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on grassroots democracy	Law on Environmental Protection No. 52/2005/ QH11 and bylaw documents
								financial conditions. - For projects funded by community contributions or direct support from organizations and individuals for communes, disclose: technical standards and processes, specifications of materials  * <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Office of Communal People's Councils, culture houses of communes and villages. + Inform in meetings. + Inform via media of communes, villages.		+ Website of environmental management organization. + In meetings of People's Councils and residential sites. + In office of Commune People's Committees and environmental management organization.
III. Design										
IV. Land acquisition				- Acquisition Notice: Reason for acquiring land, area and position of acquired land					- Approved solutions for compensation, support and resettlement	

## A4. Laws on Disclosure (CoST, 2012)

Stage – Project cycle	Laws of reference									
	Anti-corruption Law No.55/2005/ QH1 and corresponding bylaws	Construction Law No. 16/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Urban Planning Law No.30/2009/ QH12 and corresponding bylaws	Land Law No.13/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Procurement Law No. 61/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	State Budget Law No.01/2002/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Audit Law No.37/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Decision No.80/2005/QĐ -TTg on Regulation on participatory supervision and relevant documents	Ordinance No. 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on grassroots democracy	Law on Environmental Protection No. 52/2005/ QH11 and bylaw documents
				and projected movement schedule. - Approved solutions for compensation, support and resettlement.  * <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Office of Communal People's Committee where land is acquired. + Community/culture house of residential area where people activities occur					* <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Office of Communal People's Council and Committee.	
<b>V. Tender</b>	- Tender plan. - Invitation to tender for restricted bidding, shortlist of bidders. - Invitation to tender for open bidding. - List of bidders invited to tender.				- Tender plan. - Invitation to tender for restricted bidding, shortlist of bidders. - Invitation to tender for open bidding. - List of bidders invited to tender. - Tender selection result. - Information on handling violation of the	- Tender selection result that has been approved by competent authority.  * <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Offices of agencies, organizations. + Meetings/conferences of agencies, organizations.				

## A4. Laws on Disclosure (CoST, 2012)

Stage – Project cycle	Laws of reference									
	Anti-corruption Law No.55/2005/ QH1 and corresponding bylaws	Construction Law No. 16/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Urban Planning Law No.30/2009/ QH12 and corresponding bylaws	Land Law No.13/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Procurement Law No. 61/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	State Budget Law No.01/2002/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Audit Law No.37/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Decision No.80/2005/QĐ -TTg on Regulation on participatory supervision and relevant documents	Ordinance No. 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on grassroots democracy	Law on Environmental Protection No. 52/2005/ QH11 and bylaw documents
	- Tender selection result. - Information on handling violation of the procurement law. - Current legal normative documents regarding procurement.				procurement law. - Current legal normative documents regarding procurement.  * <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Tender Review + Website on tendering + Mass media.					
<b>VI. Construction</b>	- Approved total project fund. - Budget plan that is apportioned by superior management of project owner to each investment project in the year. - Investment capital of project that is yearly finalised. - Audit report.	- Name of project owner, commencement and completion dates - Name of executing contractors, name of site managers. - Name of designer, name of design manager. - Name of supervising contractors/persons. - Contact details including full name, positions, address, telephone number of project owner, site manager, design manager, supervising				- Approved total project fund. - Budget plan that is apportioned by superior management of project owner to each investment project in the year. - Investment capital of project that is yearly finalised. - Audit report.  * <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Offices of agencies, organizations. + Meetings/conferences of agencies, organizations.	- Audit report.	- Information of contractors. - For projects funded and/or implemented by community or by direct sources of organizations and individuals: acceptance and payment reports.  * <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Office of Communal People's Councils, culture houses of communes and villages.	- Construction progress.  * <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Office of Communal People's Council and Committee.	- Environmental Management Plan.  * <u>Modes of disclosure:</u> + Offices of Commune People's Committees.

## A4. Laws on Disclosure (CoST, 2012)

Stage – Project cycle	Laws of reference									
	Anti-corruption Law No.55/2005/ QH1 and corresponding bylaws	Construction Law No. 16/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Urban Planning Law No.30/2009/ QH12 and corresponding bylaws	Land Law No.13/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Procurement Law No. 61/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	State Budget Law No.01/2002/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Audit Law No.37/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Decision No.80/2005/QĐ -TTg on Regulation on participatory supervision and relevant documents	Ordinance No. 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on grassroots democracy	Law on Environmental Protection No. 52/2005/ QH11 and bylaw documents
		<p>organization/persons .</p> <p>* <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + On signboard at construction site.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>- Safety measures, rules on labour safety.</p> <p>*<u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + At construction site.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>- Inform to organizations for Quality Control, Structural Safety Certification, Quality Conformity of Works Certification and Construction Justice Appraisal</p> <p>* <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + On websites of the Ministry of Construction, Provincial Departments of Construction.</p>						+ Inform in meetings. + Inform via media of communes, villages		
<b>VII. Project completion and operation</b>	- Finalised project payment upon project completion that	- Inform to organizations for Quality Control, Structural Safety				- Finalised project payment upon project completion that is	- Audit report.			- Environmental Management Plan.

## A4. Laws on Disclosure (CoST, 2012)

Stage – Project cycle	Laws of reference									
	Anti-corruption Law No.55/2005/ QH1 and corresponding bylaws	Construction Law No. 16/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Urban Planning Law No.30/2009/ QH12 and corresponding bylaws	Land Law No.13/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Procurement Law No. 61/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	State Budget Law No.01/2002/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Audit Law No.37/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Decision No.80/2005/QĐ -TTg on Regulation on participatory supervision and relevant documents	Ordinance No. 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on grassroots democracy	Law on Environmental Protection No. 52/2005/ QH11 and bylaw documents
	is approved by competent authority	<p>Certification, Quality Conformity of Works Certification and Construction Justice Appraisal</p> <p>* <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + On websites of the Ministry of Construction, Provincial Departments of Construction.</p>				<p>approved by competent authority - Audit report.</p> <p>* <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Offices of agencies, organizations. + Meetings/conferences of agencies, organizations</p>				<p>* <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Offices of Commune People's Committees</p>
<b>VIII. Operation and Maintenance</b>		<p>- Maintenance process of works; Construction norm for maintenance.</p> <p>* <u>Modes of disclosure:</u> + Printed materials, CDs or other means.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>- Inform to organizations for Quality Control, Structural Safety Certification, Quality Conformity of Works Certification and Construction Justice Appraisal</p> <p>* <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + On websites of the Ministry of</p>							<p>- Environmental Management Plan</p> <p>* <u>Mode of disclosure:</u> + Offices of Commune People's Committees.</p>	

#### A4. Laws on Disclosure (CoST, 2012)

Stage – Project cycle	Laws of reference									
	Anti-corruption Law No.55/2005/ QH1 and corresponding bylaws	Construction Law No. 16/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Urban Planning Law No.30/2009/ QH12 and corresponding bylaws	Land Law No.13/2003/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Procurement Law No. 61/2005/ QH11and corresponding bylaws	State Budget Law No.01/2002/ QH11and corresponding bylaws	Audit Law No.37/2005/ QH11 and corresponding bylaws	Decision No.80/2005/QĐ -TTg on Regulation on participatory supervision and relevant documents	Ordinance No. 34/2007/PL-UBTVQH11 on grassroots democracy	Law on Environmental Protection No. 52/2005/ QH11 and bylaw documents
		Construction, Provincial Departments of Construction.								

## A5. Results from the Sample and Flagship Project Analysis

### Sample

Project #	PE	Total # of data points disclosed	Percentage of data points disclosed
Project 1	MOT	15	38%
Project 2	MOT	17	43%
Project 3	MOT	15	38%
Project 4	MOT	15	38%
Project 5	MOT	16	40%
Project 6	MOT	16	40%
Project 7	MOT	16	40%
Project 8	MOT	16	40%
Project 9	MOT	16	40%
Project 10	MOT	16	40%
Project 11	MARD	19	48%
Project 12	MARD	6	15%
Project 13	MARD	7	18%
Project 14	MARD	10	25%
Project 15	MARD	12	30%
Project 16	MOH	1	3%
Project 17	MOH	4	10%
Project 18	MOC	13	33%
Project 19	MOC	15	38%
Project 20	Hanoi DOET	10	25%

### Flagship Projects

Project #	Total # of data points disclosed	Percentage of data points disclosed
Line 1, Hanoi Metro	22	55%
Line 2A, Hanoi Metro	23	58%
Line 2, Hanoi Metro	23	58%
Line 3, Hanoi Metro	23	58%
Line 1, HCM Metro	32	80%
Line 2, HCM Metro	29	73%
Line 3a, HCM Metro	29	73%
Line 3b, HCM Metro	29	73%
Line 4, HCM Metro	30	75%
Line 4b, HCM Metro	29	73%
Line 5, HCM Metro	29	73%
Line 6, HCM Metro	30	75%
Nghi Son 2 Power Plant	23	58%
Duyen Hai Power Plant 1	22	55%
Duyen Hai Power Plant 2	23	58%
Duyen Hai Power Plant 3	23	58%
Duyen Hai Power Plant 3 (Extension)	23	58%

## A6. Public Infrastructure Project Information from the Sample

The sample of 20 public infrastructure projects is comprised of 10 projects (5 from MOT and 5 from MOT PPP 50%) under the MOT, 5 (21%) under MARD, 2 (12%) under MOH, 2 (12%) under MOC, and 1 (5%) under MOET/Hanoi DOET.

### **MOT**

#### **1. Construction of the Ben Luc – Long Thanh Highway**

<http://mt.gov.vn/vn/tin-tuc/35175/ket-qua-lua-chon-nha-thau-02-goi-thau-thuoc-du-an-xay-dung-duong-cao-toc-ben-luc--long-thanh.aspx>

Kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu 02 gói thầu thuộc Dự án xây dựng đường cao tốc Bến Lức – Long Thành

Thứ năm, 25/12/2014 09:46 GMT+7

Tổng Công ty Đầu tư phát triển đường cao tốc Việt Nam thông báo kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu 02 gói thầu thuộc Dự án xây dựng đường cao tốc Bến Lức – Long Thành.

Nội dung kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu:

- Tên gói thầu:** Gói thầu xây lắp A1 (Km0+600 – Km07+900)
  - Hình thức lựa chọn nhà thầu/ Phương thức đấu thầu: Đấu thầu rộng rãi quốc tế (ICB), có sơ tuyển theo quy định của ADB.
  - Nhà thầu trúng thầu: Liên danh Halla Corporation – Công ty Cổ phần đầu tư xây dựng và kỹ thuật Vinaconex (Liên danh Halla – Vinaconex E&C).
  - Hình thức hợp đồng: Theo đơn giá (*giá hợp đồng theo giá điều chỉnh*).
  - Giá gói thầu: 2.064.738.809.000 VNĐ (*giá trị này bao gồm các loại thuế, phí theo quy định và 10% dự phòng phí*).
  - Giá trúng thầu: 1.495.046.570.000 VNĐ (*giá trị này bao gồm các loại thuế, phí theo quy định và 10% dự phòng phí*).
  - Quyết định phê duyệt: Số 819/QĐ-VEC-HĐTV ngày 22/12/2014 do Chủ tịch HĐTV Trần Quốc Việt ký.
  - Thời gian thực hiện hợp đồng: 36 tháng.
- Tên gói thầu:** Gói thầu xây lắp A3 (Km16+600 – Km18+713.5)
  - Hình thức lựa chọn nhà thầu/ Phương thức đấu thầu: Đấu thầu rộng rãi quốc tế (ICB), có sơ tuyển theo quy định của ADB.
  - Nhà thầu trúng thầu: Liên danh Halla Corporation – Công ty Cổ phần đầu tư xây dựng và kỹ thuật Vinaconex (Liên danh Halla – Vinaconex E&C).
  - Hình thức hợp đồng: Theo đơn giá (*giá hợp đồng theo giá điều chỉnh*).
  - Giá gói thầu: 1.106.125.929.000 VNĐ (*giá trị này bao gồm các loại thuế, phí theo quy định và 10% dự phòng phí*).
  - Giá trúng thầu: 732.100.940.000 VNĐ (*giá trị này bao gồm các loại thuế, phí theo quy định và 10% dự phòng phí*).
  - Quyết định phê duyệt: Số 818/QĐ-VEC-HĐTV ngày 22/12/2014 do Chủ tịch HĐTV Trần Quốc Việt ký.
  - Thời gian thực hiện hợp đồng: 1095 ngày (36 tháng).

Contractor selection results 02 bidding packages of the project to build the highway Ben Luc - Long Thanh

Thursday, 12.25.2014 09:46 GMT + 7



Corporation Investment and Development Vietnam Expressway announced results of contractor selection 02 bidding packages of the project to build the highway Ben Luc - Long Thanh.

Content contractor selection results:

1. Package Name: Construction Package A1 (Km0 + 600 - Km07 + 900)

- Forms of contractor selection / procurement method: International Public bidding (ICB), has prequalified as prescribed by ADB.
- The successful Bidder: JVA Halla Corporation - JSC construction investment and technical Vinaconex (JVA Halla - Vinaconex E & C).
- Form of contract: The unit price (price adjusted price-based contract).
- Package Price: VND 2,064,738,809,000 (this value includes all taxes, fees and 10% prescribed premium reserve).
- Price winning: VND 1,495,046,570,000 (this value includes all taxes, fees and 10% prescribed premium reserve).
- Approval Decision: No. 819 / QD-VEC-Member Board Member Board dated 22.12.2014 by the Chairman Tran Quoc Vietnam signed.
- Duration of Contract: 36 months.

2. Name Package: Package construction A3 (Km16 + 600 - Km18 + 713.5)

- Forms of contractor selection / procurement method: International Public bidding (ICB), has prequalified as prescribed by ADB.
- The successful Bidder: JVA Halla Corporation - JSC construction investment and technical Vinaconex (JVA Halla - Vinaconex E & C).
- Form of contract: The unit price (price adjusted price-based contract).
- Package Price: VND 1,106,125,929,000 (this value includes all taxes, fees and 10% prescribed premium reserve).
- Price winning: VND 732,100,940,000 (this value includes all taxes, fees and 10% prescribed premium reserve).
- Approval Decision: No. 818 / QD-VEC-Member Board Member Board dated 22.12.2014 by the Chairman Tran Quoc Vietnam signed.
- Duration of the contract: 1 095 days (36 months).

**2. Construction of the Da Nang - Quang Ngai Expressway Project**

<http://mt.gov.vn/vn/tin-tuc/43772/ket-qua-lua-chon-nha-thau-goi-thau-14a1-du-an-cao-toc-da-nang---quang-ngai.aspx>

Kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu Gói thầu 14A1 Dự án cao tốc Đà Nẵng - Quảng Ngãi

Thứ ba, 19/07/2016 08:50 GMT+7

Tổng công ty Đầu tư phát triển đường cao tốc Việt Nam (VEC) vừa có Thông báo kết quả lựa chọn Nhà thầu Gói thầu 14A1: An toàn giao thông và chiếu sáng đoạn Km0+000 – Km32+600 thuộc Dự án xây dựng đường cao tốc Đà Nẵng - Quảng Ngãi.

Cụ thể như sau:

Tên bên mời thầu: Tổng Công ty Đầu tư phát triển đường cao tốc Việt Nam. Địa chỉ: Tầng 4, toà nhà MITEC-VEC, lô E2, khu đô thị mới Cầu Giấy, Tp.Hà Nội. Điện thoại: 043.643.0275 - Fax: 043.643.0270 - Email: duongcaotoc@tctvec.vn

Kết quả lựa chọn Nhà thầu với nội dung sau:

STT	1		2	
Tên dự án	Dự án xây dựng đường cao tốc Đà Nẵng – Quảng Ngãi		Dự án xây dựng đường cao tốc Đà Nẵng – Quảng Ngãi	
Tên gói thầu	Gói thầu 14A1: An toàn giao thông và chiếu sáng đoạn Km0+000 – Km32+600		Gói thầu 14A2: An toàn giao thông và chiếu sáng đoạn Km32+600 – Km65+000	
Số thông báo mời thầu	--		--	
Hình thức lựa chọn nhà thầu	Đấu thầu rộng rãi quốc tế (ICB) – Có sơ tuyển theo quy định của JICA/một túi hồ sơ		Đấu thầu rộng rãi quốc tế (ICB) – Có sơ tuyển theo quy định của JICA/một túi hồ sơ	
Giá gói thầu	310.487.888.095 VNĐ		299.947.055.603 VNĐ	
Giá trúng thầu	280.543.575.923 VNĐ		272.175.358.644 VNĐ	
Nhà thầu trúng thầu	Liên danh Tổng công ty Cổ phần Xuất nhập khẩu và xây dựng Việt Nam – Công ty Cổ phần giải pháp tòa nhà thông minh	(Tổng công ty Cổ phần Xuất nhập khẩu và xây dựng Việt Nam đứng đầu liên danh)	Liên danh Tổng công ty Cổ phần Xuất nhập khẩu và xây dựng Việt Nam – Công ty Cổ phần giải pháp tòa nhà thông minh	(Tổng công ty Cổ phần Xuất nhập khẩu và xây dựng Việt Nam đứng đầu liên danh)
Loại hợp đồng	Hợp đồng theo đơn giá có điều chỉnh		Hợp đồng theo đơn giá có điều chỉnh	
Thời gian thực hiện hợp đồng	18 tháng		18 tháng	
Quyết định phê duyệt	Số 425/QĐ-VEC-HĐTV ngày 15/7/2016 do Chủ tịch Hội đồng thành viên Trần Quốc Việt ký.		Số 425/QĐ-VEC-HĐTV ngày 15/7/2016 do Chủ tịch Hội đồng thành viên Trần Quốc Việt ký.	

Đại diện hợp pháp của bên mời thầu

KT. TỔNG GIÁM ĐỐC  
PHÓ TỔNG GIÁM ĐỐC

(đã ký)

Nguyễn Thế Cường

Contractor selection results 14A1 Package Expressway Project Da Nang - Quang Ngai  
Tuesday, 19/7/2016 08:50 GMT + 7

Corporation Investment and Development Vietnam Expressway (VEC) has Announced the contractor selection results 14A1 Package: Traffic safety and lighting Km0 + 000 - Km32 + 600 of road construction projects Expressway Danang - Quang Ngai. As follows:

Name of the tenderer: Corporation for Investment and Development Vietnam Expressway.  
Address: Floor 4, Building MITEC-VEC, Lot E2, new urban areas Cau Giay, Ha Noi. Phone: 043.643.0275 - Fax: 043.643.0270 - Email: duongcaotoc@tctvec.vn

Contractor selection results with the following content:

<b>Number</b>	1		2	
<b>Project Name</b>	Project construction highway Da Nang - Quang Ngai		Project construction highway Da Nang - Quang Ngai	
<b>Package Name</b>	14A1 bid packages: Traffic safety and lighting Km0 + 000 - Km32 + 600		14A2 bid packages: Traffic safety and Km32 + 600 section lighting - Km65 + 000	
<b>Tender Notice Number</b>	--		--	
<b>Contractor Selection Type</b>	International public bidding (ICB) - There prequalification prescribed by JICA / one envelope		International public bidding (ICB) - There prequalification prescribed by JICA / one envelope	
<b>Package Price</b>	310.487.888.095 VNĐ		299.947.055.603 VNĐ	
<b>Winning Price</b>	280.543.575.923 VNĐ		272.175.358.644 VNĐ	
<b>Successful Bidder</b>	Associates of the Import and Export Corporation and build Vietnam - JSC intelligent building solutions	(Stock Corporation Export & Construction Vietnam Consortium Leader)	Associates of the Import and Export Corporation and build Vietnam - JSC intelligent building solutions	(Stock Corporation Export & Construction Vietnam Consortium Leader)
<b>Type of Contract</b>	Contracts based on unit prices adjusted		Contracts based on unit prices adjusted	
<b>Duration of Contract</b>	18 months		18 months	
<b>Decision number</b>	No. 425 / QD-VEC-Member Board dated 15.07.2016 by the Chairman of the Board member Tran Quoc Vietnam signed.		No. 425 / QD-VEC-Member Board dated 15.07.2016 by the Chairman of the Board member Tran Quoc Vietnam signed.	

Legal representative of the tenderer

KT. GENERAL MANAGER

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

(Signed)

Nguyen The Cuong

**3. Upgrade and expand the Ho Chi Minh trail and Serepok bridge, Dak Lak and Dak Nong province**

<http://mt.gov.vn/vn/tin-tuc/18626/ban-qlda-duong-ho-chi-minh-thong-bao-ket-qua-lua-chon-nha-thau-goi-thau-so-5-xay-lap-doan-km1861---km1867-thuoc-du-an-dau-tu-nang-cap--mo-rong-duong-ho-chi-minh-va-cau-serepok--tinh-dak-lak-va-tinh-dak-nong.aspx>

Ban QLDA đường Hồ Chí Minh thông báo kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu Gói thầu số 5 Xây lắp đoạn Km1861 - Km1867 thuộc Dự án đầu tư nâng cấp, mở rộng đường Hồ Chí Minh và cầu Serepok, tỉnh Đắk Lắk và tỉnh Đắk Nông

Thứ năm, 21/11/2013 16:21 GMT+7

Ban QLDA đường Hồ Chí Minh thông báo kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu Gói thầu số 5 Xây lắp đoạn Km1861 - Km1867 thuộc Dự án đầu tư nâng cấp, mở rộng đường Hồ Chí Minh đoạn Km1824 - Km1876 (Km765 - Km817 QL14) và cầu Serepok Km1792+850 - Km1793+600 (Km733+850 - Km734+600 QL14), tỉnh Đắk Lắk và tỉnh Đắk Nông.

Nội dung chính về kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu:

- Tên gói thầu: Gói thầu số 5 Xây lắp đoạn Km1861 - Km1867.
- Hình thức lựa chọn Nhà thầu: Chỉ định thầu.
- Giá gói thầu: 122.044.903.000 đồng.
- Giá trúng thầu: 109.104.421.066 đồng.
- Nhà thầu trúng thầu: Liên danh Tổng công ty Xây dựng Trường Sơn - Công ty TNHH MTV Xây dựng 470.
- Quyết định phê duyệt: Số 3678/QĐ-BGTVT ngày 15/11/2013 của Bộ Giao thông vận tải.
- Hình thức hợp đồng: Theo đơn giá điều chỉnh.
- Thời gian thực hiện hợp đồng: 24 tháng.

Ho Chi Minh Trail PMB announced results of contractor selection No. 5 Construction Package Km1861 segment - Km1867 of investment projects to upgrade, expand the Ho Chi Minh trail and bridge Serepok, Dak Lak and Dak Nong province

Thursday year, 11.21.2013 16:21 GMT + 7

Ho Chi Minh Trail PMB announced results of contractor selection No. 5 Construction Package Km1861 segment - Km1867 under investment project to upgrade and expand the HCM segment Km1824 - Km1876 (Km765 - Km817 QL14) and demand Serepok Km1792 + 850 - + 600 Km1793 (Km733 + 850 - + 600 Km734 QL14), Dak Lak and Dak Nong.

The main content of the contractor selection results:

- Package Name: Package No. 5 Construction Km1861 segment - Km1867.
- Type of Contractor selection: Specify contractor.
- Package Price: 122 044 903 000 dong.
- Bid price: 109 104 421 066 dong.
- The successful Bidder: Consortium Corporation Truong Son Construction - Construction Company Limited 470.
- Approval Decision: No. 3678 / QD-BGTVT 11.15.2013 Transport Ministry.
- Form of contract: According to adjust the rates.
- Duration of Contract: 24 months.

#### **4. Construction of air traffic control radio Cat Bi International airport**

<http://mt.gov.vn/vn/tin-tuc/34921/ket-qua-lua-chon-nha-thau-goi-thau-so-10-thuoc-du-an-dau-tu-xay-dung-cong-trinh-dai-kiem-soat-khong-luu-cang-hang-khong-quoc-te-cat-bi.aspx>

Kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu gói thầu số 10 thuộc Dự án Đầu tư xây dựng công trình “Đài kiểm soát không lưu Cảng hàng không Quốc tế Cát Bi”

Thứ ba, 02/12/2014 15:11 GMT+7

Tổng công ty Quản lý bay Việt Nam thông báo kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu gói thầu số 10 thuộc Dự án Đầu tư xây dựng công trình “Đài kiểm soát không lưu Cảng hàng không Quốc tế Cát Bi”.

Nội dung kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu:

- Tên gói thầu: Gói thầu số 10: Giám sát thi công xây lắp.
- Hình thức lựa chọn nhà thầu: Đấu thầu rộng rãi trong nước.
- Giá gói thầu: 901.520.231 VNĐ (Chưa bao gồm dự phòng phí).
- Giá trúng thầu: 941.308.746 VNĐ (đã bao gồm phí dự phòng rủi ro, trượt giá).
- Nhà thầu trúng thầu: Công ty CP Tư vấn xây dựng và Dịch vụ hàng không.
- Quyết định phê duyệt: Số 5520/QĐ-QLB ngày 01/12/2014 của Tổng công ty Quản lý bay Việt Nam.
- Loại hợp đồng: Trọn gói.
- Thời gian thực hợp đồng: 15 tháng.

Contractor selection results Package No. 10 under the Investment Project construction "air traffic control radio airports Cat Bi International"

Tuesday, 12/2/2014 15:11 GMT + 7

Air Traffic Management Corporation Vietnam announced the results of the bidding for the selection of the 10 projects under construction Investment "air traffic control radio airports Cat Bi International".

Content contractor selection results:

- Package Name: Package No. 10: Monitoring of construction and installation.
- Forms of selecting contractors: Public bidding in the country.
- Package Price: VND 901 520 231 (not including premium reserve).
- Bid price: 941 308 746 VND (including risk provision charges, depreciation).

- The successful Bidder: JSC Consulting Construction and Aviation Services.
- Approval Decision: No. 5520 / QD-QLB date 01.12.2014 Management Corporation Vietnam flying.
- Contract type: Package.
- Contract duration: 15 months.

## **5. Provision of technical assistance to support the Dau Giay – Phan Thiet Highway project**

<http://mt.gov.vn/vn/tin-tuc/14600/ban-quan-ly-du-an-1--bo-gtvt--thong-bao-ket-qua-lua-chon-nha-thau-goi-thau-mot-cs-1.aspx>

Ban Quản lý dự án 1- Bộ GTVT: Thông báo Kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu gói thầu MOT-CS-1

Thứ sáu, 30/08/2013 12:28 GMT+7

Ban quản lý dự án 1- Bộ Giao thông vận tải vừa có thông báo Kết quả lựa chọn nhà thầu gói thầu MOT-CS-1 - Cập nhật hoàn thiện kế hoạch hành động an toàn xã hội, tái định cư thuộc Dự án Hỗ trợ kỹ thuật “Phát triển hợp tác đầu tư PPP trong lĩnh vực Giao thông” - Hợp phần “Hỗ trợ kỹ thuật dự án đường cao tốc Dầu Giây - Phan Thiết”.

Nội dung:

Tên gói thầu: MOT-CS-1-Cập nhật hoàn thiện kế hoạch hành động an toàn xã hội, tái định cư.

Hình thức lựa chọn nhà thầu: Tuyển chọn dựa trên năng lực tư vấn (CQS).

Giá gói thầu: 3.775.996.000đ

Giá trúng thầu: 3.749.726.200đ

Nhà thầu trúng thầu: Trung tâm nghiên cứu và tư vấn về phát triển.

Quyết định phê duyệt: Quyết định số 2510/QĐ-BGTVT ngày 23/8/2013 của Bộ trưởng Bộ GTVT.

Hình thức hợp đồng: Trọn gói.

Thời gian thực hiện hợp đồng: 04 tháng

Project Management Board 1. MOT: Announcement Results of the bidding option MOT-CS-1

Friday, 08/30/2013 12:28 GMT + 7

Project Management Board 1. The Ministry of Transport has announced results of selection of contractor bid packages MOT-CS-1 - Update complete action plan and social security, resettlement of Project Support technical assistance "Development cooperation and investment in the field of Communications PPP" - component "technical assistance project Dau Giay highway - Phan Thiet".

Content:

Package Name: MOT-CS-1-Update complete action plan and social security and resettlement.

Forms of contractor selection: Selection based on consultant capacity (CQS).

Package price: 3.775.996.000đ

Price winning: 3.749.726.200đ

Successful bidder: Center for Research and development consultancy.

Approval Decision: Decision No. 2510 / QD-BGTVT 08/23/2013 of the Minister of Transport.  
 Form of contract: Package.  
 Duration of the contract: 04 months

## 6. Construction, renovation and upgrading of the Binh Dinh – Gia Lai Highway (BOT)

<http://ppp.mt.gov.vn/pppunit/ProjectDetail?id=2163>

Dự án đầu tư xây dựng công trình cải tạo, nâng cấp Quốc lộ 19 đoạn Km17+027 - Km50+00 trên địa phận tỉnh Bình Định và đoạn Km 108+00 - Km131+300 trên địa phận tỉnh Gia Lai theo hình thức hợp đồng BOT

Thông tin chung			
Mã dự án	01.01.2163		
Cơ quan nhà nước có thẩm quyền	Bộ Giao thông vận tải		
Nhà đầu tư	Tổng công ty 36		
	Số vốn CSH: 279,50 (Tỷ đồng)	Tỷ lệ: 100%	
Ngành/Lĩnh vực	Đường bộ		
Nhóm dự án	Nhóm A		
Nội dung chủ yếu	Địa điểm xây dựng: Tỉnh Bình Định và Gia Lai		
	Phạm vi dự án: (1). Đoạn qua tỉnh Bình Định điểm đầu tại Km17+027, thuộc địa phận thị xã An Nhơn, điểm cuối tại Km50+00 thuộc địa phận huyện Tây Sơn; (2) Đoạn qua tỉnh Gia Lai điểm đầu tại Km108+00 thuộc địa phận huyện Đăk Pơ, điểm cuối tại Km131+300 thuộc địa phận huyện Mang Yang.		
	Chiều dài: 55,726 Km		
	Quy mô đầu tư: Đoạn thông thường Bnền=12m, Bmặt=11m, bao gồm 2 làn xe cơ giới. Riêng đoạn qua đèo núi Bnền=9m, B mặt=8m; Đoạn qua khu dân cư tập trung Bnền=15m, bao gồm 2 làn xe cơ giới; 2 làn xe hỗn hợp và hệ thống thoát nước dọc.		
	Tổng mức đầu tư: 2.045,00 (Tỷ đồng)	Giá trị quyết toán: Chưa quyết toán	
	Nguồn vốn:	+ Vốn tư nhân: 2.045,00 (Tỷ đồng)	
		+ Vốn đầu tư nhà nước: 0,00 (Tỷ đồng)	
	Hình thức hợp đồng : Xây dựng – Kinh doanh – Chuyển giao		
	Hỗ trợ của nhà nước: không		
	Trạm thu phí, mức phí: Chi tiết		

Mục tiêu đầu tư	Nâng cao năng lực thông hành, đáp ứng nhu cầu vận tải ngày càng tăng cao, bảo đảm an toàn giao thông, thúc đẩy phát triển kinh tế, xã hội của tỉnh Bình Định, tỉnh Gia Lai nói riêng và Tây Nguyên nói chung, đặc biệt là hành lang vận tải quan trọng Đông - Tây nối cảng biển Quy Nhơn với Tây Nguyên và các nước láng giềng Lào, Campuchia, đông bắc Thái Lan; phù hợp với quy hoạch và định hướng phát triển giao thông.	
Ngày khởi công	22/12/13	
Ngày hoàn thành	15/01/16	
Thời gian vận hành, khai thác	18 năm 4 tháng 23 ngày	Sau quyết toán:

The investment project construction renovation and upgrading Highway Km17 + 027 section 19 - Km50 + 00 in Binh Dinh Province and paragraph 00 Km 108 + - + 300 Km131 on Gia Lai Province in the form of BOT

General Information			
Project Code	01.01.2163		
Competent State Agency	Ministry of Transport		
Investor	Corporation 36		
	Owners Equity: 279.5 (bn VND)	Investors Equity Ratio: 100%	
Sector/Field	Roads		
Project Group	Group A		
Major Content	Construction location: Binh Dinh and Gia Lai		
	Scope of the project: (1). Running through Binh Dinh province at Km17 + 027 points early, located in An Nhon Town, at Km50 + 00 endpoints located in Xishan District; (2) The first point through Gia Lai at Km108 + 00 is located in Dak Po District, at Km131 + 300 endpoints located in Mang Yang district.		
	Length: 55.726 Km		
	Investment scale: The usual surface = 12m, foundation = 11m, including two lanes for motorized vehicles. Particularly passage through mountain passes surface = 9m, foundation = 8m; Running through densely populated areas surface = 15m, including two lanes for motorized vehicles; 2 lanes composite and vertical drainage system.		
	Total Investment: 2,045 (bn VND)	Value settlements: No settlement	
	Capital:	+ Private Equity: 2,045 (bn VND)	
+ State Equity: 0 (bn VND)			



	Contract Type: Build – Operate – Transfer	
	State Support: No	
	Tollbooth Fee: See link for further details	
Investment Objective	Travel capacity to meet transport demand increasing, ensuring traffic safety, promote economic development and social of Binh Dinh, Gia Lai province in particular and the Central Highlands in general, especially important transport corridor East - West connection Quy Nhon seaport with the Central Highlands and neighboring countries Laos, Cambodia, northeastern Thailand; consistent with the planning and development oriented traffic.	
Commencement Date	22/12/13	
Completion Date	15/01/16	
Duration of Operation	18 years, 4 months and 23 days	After Finalisation:

## 7. **Construction of a bypass around Thanh Hoa city (BOT)**

<http://ppp.mt.gov.vn/pppunit/ProjectDetail?id=1141>

Dự án ĐTXD QL1A đoạn tránh TP Thanh Hóa theo hình thức BOT & Bổ sung Đầu tư bổ sung hạng mục đường vành đai phía Tây TP. Thanh Hóa (giai đoạn 1) đoạn Km0-Km6

Thông tin chung	
Mã dự án	01.01.1141
Cơ quan nhà nước có thẩm quyền	Bộ Giao thông vận tải
Ngành/Lĩnh vực	Đường bộ
Nhóm dự án	Nhóm B
Nội dung chủ yếu	Địa điểm xây dựng: Tp. Thanh Hóa và huyện Sơn Đông, tỉnh Thanh Hóa
	Phạm vi dự án: QL1 đoạn tránh Thanh Hóa: Điểm đầu tại Km322+100 (QL1A); Điểm cuối: Giao với QL1A tại Km330+200. Hạng mục đường Vành đai phía Tây TP Thanh Hóa : Điểm đầu giao với QL1 tại Km322+70; điểm cuối giao với QL47 tại Km6+00 (lý trình dự án)
	Chiều dài: QL1 tránh TP Thanh Hóa dài 9.98km; Hạng mục đường vành đai phía Tây TP Thanh Hóa dài 6km

	Quy mô đầu tư: QL1 tránh TP Thanh Hóa: Quy mô 04 làn xe, Bền = 26m; Hạ tầng bổ sung: Quy mô 02 làn xe, Bền = 12m.	
	Tổng mức đầu tư: 1.836,57 (Tỷ đồng)	Giá trị quyết toán : Chưa quyết toán
	Nguồn vốn:	+ Vốn tư nhân: 1.695,55 (Tỷ đồng)
		+ Vốn đầu tư nhà nước: 141,02 (Tỷ đồng)
	Hình thức hợp đồng : Xây dựng – Kinh doanh – Chuyển giao	
	Hỗ trợ của nhà nước: GPMB và một số chi phí khác	
	Trạm thu phí, mức phí: Chi tiết	
Mục tiêu đầu tư	Nhằm đáp ứng nhu cầu vận tải, giảm thiểu tình trạng ùn tắc và TNGT khu vực thành phố Thanh Hóa; phục vụ phát triển KT-XH, đảm bảo an ninh quốc phòng trong khu vực nói chung và tỉnh Thanh Hóa nói riêng, phù hợp với quy hoạch và định hướng phát triển GTVT.	
Ngày khởi công	25/04/2005	
Thời gian vận hành, khai thác	13 năm 8 tháng	Sau quyết toán:

1A bypass construction investment project in Thanh Hoa City under BOT & Additional Investment supplementation City ring road west. Thanh Hoa (phase 1) Km0-Km6

General Information	
Project Code	01.01.1141
Competent State Agency	Ministry of Transport
Sector/Field	Roads
Project Group	Group B
Major Content	Construction location: Thanh Hoa and Son Dong district, Thanh Hoa province
	Scope of the project: National Road 1 bypass Thanh Hoa: First point at Km322 + 100 (1A); Last point: Communications at Km330 + 200 to 1A. Items Ring Road west of Thanh Hoa City: point of the National Road 1 at Km322 + 70; the ending point at Km6 QL47 + 00 (of the project)

	Length: Length: Long Thanh Hoa NH1 9.98km avoided; Items Ring Road west of Thanh Hoa city 6km	
	Investment scale: NH1 avoid Thanh Hoa: Scale 04 lanes, surface = 26m; Additional categories: size 02 lanes, surface = 12m.	
	Total Investment: 1,836.57 (bn VND)	Value settlements: No settlement
	Capital:	+ Private Equity: 1,695.55 (bn VND)
		+ State Equity: 141.02 (bn VND)
	Contract Type: Build – Operate – Transfer	
	State Support: The cost of site clearance and some other	
	Tollbooth Fee: See link for further details	
Investment Objective	To meet the needs of transport, reduce congestion and traffic accidents Thanh Hoa City area; serve socio- economic development, defense and security in the region in general and in particular in Thanh Hoa province, in accordance with the planning and development orientation of Transportation.	
Commencement Date	25/04/2005	
Duration of Operation	13 years and 8 months	After Finalisation:

## 8. **Construction of a tunnel in Thua Thien Hue Province (BOT)**

<http://ppp.mt.gov.vn/pppunit/ProjectDetail?id=1123>

Dự án đầu tư xây dựng hầm đường bộ Phước Tượng và Phú Gia, QL1A, tỉnh Thừa Thiên Huế, theo hình thức Hợp đồng BOT.

Thông tin chung	
Mã dự án	01.01.1123
Cơ quan nhà nước có thẩm quyền	Bộ Giao thông vận tải
Nhà đầu tư	Liên danh: Công ty TNHH BOT Hưng Phát, Công ty Cổ phần Đầu tư thương mại quốc tế Hà Thành, Công ty Cổ phần Đầu tư và xây dựng Việt Thành
	Công ty TNHH BOT Hưng Phát

	Số vốn CSH: 123,26 (Tỷ đồng)	Tỷ lệ: 47,36%	
	Công ty Cổ phần Đầu tư thương mại quốc tế Hà Thành		
	Số vốn CSH: 124,50 (Tỷ đồng)	Tỷ lệ: 47,84%	
	Công ty Cổ phần Đầu tư và xây dựng Việt Thành		
	Số vốn CSH: 12,45 (Tỷ đồng)	Tỷ lệ: 4,8%	
Ngành/Lĩnh vực	Đường bộ		
Nhóm dự án	Nhóm A		
Nội dung chủ yếu	Địa điểm xây dựng: Huyện Phú Lộc, tỉnh Thừa Thiên Huế		
	Phạm vi dự án: Toàn bộ tuyến khoảng 8km. Hàm Phước Tượng và đường dẫn vào hầm: khoảng từ Km867+950 - Km872+915, QL1		
	Chiều dài: 8 Km		
	Quy mô đầu tư: Phần đường dẫn vào hầm: - Cấp đường: theo tiêu chuẩn đường cấp III đồng bằng (TCVN 4054-2005), vận tốc thiết kế 80km/h. - Quy mô mặt cắt ngang: Chiều rộng nền đường Bn=12m; mặt đường Bm=7m. Phần hầm: - Theo TCVN 4527-1988 có tham khảo các tiêu chuẩn hiện hành trên thế giới. - Quy mô 2 làn xe cơ giới, bề rộng hầm Bh=11,5m. Phần cầu: - Theo tiêu chuẩn 22TCN272-05. - Khổ cầu: Phù hợp với khổ đường.		
	Tổng mức đầu tư: 1.743,19 (Tỷ đồng)	Giá trị quyết toán: Chưa quyết toán	
	Nguồn vốn:	+ Vốn tư nhân: 1.743,19 (Tỷ đồng)	
		+ Vốn đầu tư nhà nước: 0,00 (Tỷ đồng)	
	Hình thức hợp đồng : Xây dựng – Kinh doanh – Chuyển giao		
	Trạm thu phí, mức phí: Chi tiết		
Mục tiêu đầu tư	Nhằm đáp ứng nhu cầu vận tải ngày càng tăng cao trên Quốc lộ 1A, giảm ùn tắc và tai nạn giao thông, đồng thời phục vụ phát triển kinh tế xã hội và bảo đảm an ninh quốc phòng khu vực, phù hợp với quy hoạch và định hướng phát triển giao thông vận tải		
Ngày khởi công	24/10/2013		

Thời gian vận hành, khai thác	19 năm 02 tháng 17 ngày	Sau quyết toán:
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The investment project to build a pedestrian tunnel and Phu Gia Phuoc Tuong, 1A, Thua Thien Hue province, in the form of BOT.

General Information	
Project Code	01.01.1123
Competent State Agency	Ministry of Transport
Investor	Contact Name: BOT Hung Phat Co., JSC International Trade Investment Ha Thanh, JSC Construction Investment and Vietnam Thanh
	BOT Hung Phat Company Limited
	Owners Equity: 123.26 (bn VND)      Investors Equity Ratio: 47.36%
	Investment Joint Stock Company Ha Thanh international trade
	Owners Equity: 124.50 (bn VND)      Investors Equity Ratio: 47.84%
	JSC Investment and Construction Vietnam Thanh
Owners Equity: 12.45 (bn VND)      Investors Equity Ratio: 4.8%	
Sector/Field	Road
Project Group	Group A
Major Content	Construction Location: Phu Loc District, Thua Thien Hue Province
	Scope of project: The entire route is about 8km. Tunnel Phuoc Tuong and path into the pit: between Km867 + 950 - Km872 + 915, National Road 1
	Length: 8 Km
	Investment Scale: The path to the tunnel: - Level Road: III road standards Delta (TCVN 4054-2005), the design speed of 80km / h. - Cross section size: Width = 12m surface roadbed; foundation = 7m pavement. Basement: - According to TCVN 4527-1988 with reference to the current standards in the world. - Size 2 motor lanes, width of 11.5 meters tunnel = Bh. Part requirements: - By the standards 22TCN272-05. - Bridge width: Fit gauge.
	Total Investment: 1,743.19 (bn VND)      Value Settlements: No settlement
	Capital:      + Private Equity: 1,743.19 (bn VND)

		+ State Equity: 0.00 (bn VND)
	Form of contract: Build – Operate – Transfer	
	Tollbooth Fee: See link for further details	
Investment Objective	In order to meet transport demand increasing on National Highway 1A, reduce congestion and traffic accidents, while serving socio-economic development and ensuring national defense and security sector, in line with planning oriented development and transportation	
Commencement Date	24/10/2013	
Duration of Operation	19 years, 02 months, and 17 days	After Finalisation:

### 9. Construction, renovation and upgrade of the Saigon River flows (BOT)

<http://ppp.mt.gov.vn/pppunit/ProjectDetail?id=2239>

Dự án đầu tư xây dựng công trình cải tạo, nâng cấp luồng sông Sài Gòn từ cầu đường sắt Bình Lợi tới cảng Bến Súc theo hình thức hợp đồng BOT.

Thông tin chung		
Mã dự án	03.01.2239	
Cơ quan nhà nước có thẩm quyền	Cục đường thủy nội địa Việt Nam	
Nhà đầu tư	Liên danh: Công ty Cổ phần Đầu tư & Phát triển Đô thị xanh, Công Ty Cổ Phần Đầu Tư & Xây Dựng Std Việt Nam	
	Công ty Cổ phần Đầu tư & Phát triển Đô thị xanh	
	Số vốn CSH: 94,60 (Tỷ đồng)	Tỷ lệ: 55%
	Công Ty Cổ Phần Đầu Tư & Xây Dựng Std Việt Nam	
	Số vốn CSH: 77,40 (Tỷ đồng)	Tỷ lệ: 45%
Ngành/Lĩnh vực	Đường thủy	
Nhóm dự án	Nhóm B	
Nội dung chủ yếu	Địa điểm xây dựng: TP. Hồ Chí Minh và Bình Dương	

<p>Phạm vi dự án: a) Luồng sông Sài Gòn: - Điểm đầu: Cầu đường sắt Bình Lợi, phường Hiệp Bình Chánh, quận Thủ Đức; phường 13, quận Bình Thạnh, Tp. Hồ Chí Minh. - Điểm cuối: Cảng Bến Súc, huyện Dầu Tiếng, tỉnh Bình Dương. Chiều dài khoảng 71Km. b) Cầu đường sắt Bình Lợi: - Điểm đầu: Tại lý trình Km 1718+521 (Lý trình đường sắt). - Điểm cuối: Tại lý trình Km 1719+820 (Lý trình đường sắt). Chiều dài khoảng 1,3Km.</p>		
<p>Chiều dài: Luồng sông Sài Gòn: 71Km; Cầu đường sắt Bình Lợi: 1,3Km</p>		
<p>Quy mô đầu tư: Luồng sông Sài Gòn: Luồng tàu thiết kế 2 làn; chuẩn tắc luồng B = 60m, H =4,6m, Rmin=150m, mái dốc nạo vét m=10, mực nước thiết kế luồng ứng với tần suất 98% đường tần suất lũy tích mực nước giờ. - Cầu đường sắt Bình Lợi: Đường sắt khổ 1435mm, trước mắt đặt ray khổ 1000mm; vận tốc thiết kế 100Km/h; tải trọng tàu thiết kế T16; tải trọng người đi bộ 300kg/m<sup>2</sup>; Khổ thông thuyền BxH = 50m x7m; Tần suất thiết kế: H1%. - Đường sắt hai đầu cầu: Vận tốc thiết kế 100Km/h. Tải trọng tàu thiết kế T14; Bề rộng nền đường tối thiểu 5m.</p>		
<p>Tổng mức đầu tư: 1.302,88 (Tỷ đồng)</p>		<p>Giá trị quyết toán: Chưa quyết toán</p>
<p>Nguồn vốn:</p>		<p>+ Vốn tư nhân: 846,88 (Tỷ đồng) + Vốn đầu tư nhà nước: 456,00 (Tỷ đồng)</p>
<p>Hình thức hợp đồng : Xây dựng – Kinh doanh – Chuyển giao</p>		
<p>Mục tiêu đầu tư</p>	<p>Cải tạo nâng cấp luồng sông Sài Gòn đoạn từ cầu đường sắt Bình Lợi đến cảng Bến Súc, bao gồm nâng cao tính không cầu đường sắt Bình Lợi nhằm hạn chế tại nạn đường sắt và đường sông, đáp ứng nhu cầu vận tải, phục vụ phát triển kinh tế - xã hội khu vực nói chung và TP. HCM, tỉnh Bình Dương nói riêng, phù hợp với quy hoạch và định hướng phát triển giao thông vận tải</p>	
<p>Thời gian vận hành, khai thác</p>	<p>20 năm 9 tháng</p>	<p>Sau quyết toán:</p>

The investment project construction, renovation and upgrade of the Saigon River flows from the railway bridge to the port of Ben Súc Binh Loi in the form of BOT.

General Information	
Project Code	03.01.2239
Competent State Agency	Inland Waterway Bureau Vietnam
Investor	Contact Name: JSC Investment & Urban Development Green Corporation Construction Investment & Std Vietnam

Sector/Field	JSC Investment & Urban Development Green	
	Owners Equity: 94.60 (bn VND)	Investors Equity Ratio: 55%
	Corporation Construction Investment & Std Vietnam	
	Owners Equity: 77.40 (bn VND)	Investors Equity Ratio: 45%
	Waterway	
Project Group	Group B	
Major Content	Construction Location: Ho Chi Minh City and Binh Duong Province	
	Scope of project: Saigon River Flow: - Starting point: Railway Binh Loi Bridge, Hiep Binh Chanh Ward, Thu Duc District; Ward 13, Binh Thanh District, HCMC. Ho Chi Minh. - Last point: Port of Ben Suc, Dau Tieng District, Binh Duong Province. Length of about 71km. b) railway Binh Loi Bridge: - Starting point: At the Km 1718 + 521 for (Li railway). - Last point: At the Km 1719 + 820 for (Li railway). Length about 1.3Km.	
	Length: Saigon River Flow: 71km; Binh Loi Bridge rail: 1.3Km	
	Investment Scale: Saigon River Flow: Stream 2 lanes ship design; normal flow B = 60m, H = 4.6 m, RMIN = 150M, slope dredging m = 10, the water level design flow with the frequency of 98% cumulative frequency line level now. - Binh Loi Bridge rail: Rail size 1435mm, 1000mm gauge placed ahead; design speed 100 km / h; T16 ships load design; Pedestrian load 300kg / m2; Ships of x7m BxH = 50m; Frequency design: H1%. - Railways two bridge: design speed 100 km / h. T14 ships load design; Roadbed width 5m minimum.	
	Total Investment: 1,302.88 (bn VND)	Value Settlements: No settlement
	Capital:	+ Private Equity: 846.88 (bn VND)
		+ State Equity: 456.00 (bn VND)
	Form of contract: Build – Operate – Transfer	
Investment Objective	Renovate and upgrade the Saigon River flows from segment Binh Loi bridge rail to the port of Ben Suc, including enhanced clearance of Binh Loi bridge rail to limit accidents rail and river transport needs, for economic development - society in general and the city area. HCMC, Binh Duong province in particular, in accordance with the planning and development-oriented transport	



Duration of Operation	20 years and 9 months	After Finalisation:
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### 10. Expansion of the National Highway in Thua Thien Hue Province (BOT)

<http://ppp.mt.gov.vn/pppunit/ProjectDetail?id=2275>

Dự án mở rộng QL1 đoạn Km791A+500-Km848+875, tỉnh Thừa Thiên Huế.

Thông tin chung			
Mã dự án	01.01.2275		
Cơ quan nhà nước có thẩm quyền	Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh Thừa Thiên Huế		
Nhà đầu tư	Công ty TNHH Trùng Phương		
	Số vốn CSH: 296,00 (Tỷ đồng)	Tỷ lệ: 100%	
Ngành/Lĩnh vực	Đường bộ		
Nhóm dự án	Nhóm A		
Nội dung chủ yếu	Địa điểm xây dựng: Tỉnh Thừa Thiên Huế		
	Phạm vi dự án: Điểm đầu tại Km791A+500, huyện Phòng Điền, tỉnh Thừa Thiên Huế; điểm cuối tại Km848+785, huyện Phú Lộc, tỉnh Thừa Thiên Huế		
	Chiều dài: 31,3 Km		
	Quy mô đầu tư: Tiêu chuẩn cấp 3 đồng bằng, 4 làn xe, bề rộng nền đường B <sub>nền</sub> =20,5m.		
	Tổng mức đầu tư: 2.209,66 (Tỷ đồng)	Giá trị quyết toán: Chưa quyết toán	
	Nguồn vốn:	+ Vốn tư nhân: 2.209,66 (Tỷ đồng)	
		+ Vốn đầu tư nhà nước: 0,00 (Tỷ đồng)	
	Hình thức hợp đồng : Xây dựng – Kinh doanh – Chuyển giao		
Trạm thu phí, mức phí: Chi tiết			

Mục tiêu đầu tư	Nhằm đảm bảo giao thông trong mùa mưa lũ đồng thời cải thiện điều kiện khai thác, ùn tắc giao thông trên Quốc lộ 1, phục vụ phát triển kinh tế xã hội, an ninh Quốc phòng khu vực nói chung và tỉnh Thừa Thiên Huế nói riêng, phù hợp với qui hoạch và định hướng phát triển GTVT	
Ngày khởi công	22/08/2013	
Ngày hoàn thành	31/12/2015	
Thời gian vận hành, khai thác	22 năm 08 tháng	Sau quyết toán:

National Road 1 Expansion Project 500-Km848 paragraph Km791A + + 875, Thua Thien Hue Province

General Information		
Project Code	01.01.2275	
Competent State Agency	Thua Thien Hue Provincial People's Committee	
Investor	Trung Phuong Company Limited	
	Owners Equity: 296.00 (bn VND)	Investors Equity Ratio: 100%
Sector/Field	Roads	
Project Group	Group A	
Major Content	Construction location: Thua Thien Hue Province	
	Scope of the project: Beginning at Km791A + 500, Phong Dien District, Thua Thien Hue province; at Km848 + 785 endpoints, Phu Loc District, Thua Thien Hue Province	
	Length: 31.3 Km	
	Investment scale: Plain level 3 standards, with 4 lanes, roadbed width = 20.5 m surface.	
	Total Investment: 2,209.66 (bn VND)	Value settlements: No settlement
	Capital:	+ Private Equity: 2,209.66 (bn VND)
+ State Equity: 0 (bn VND)		

	Contract Type: Build – Operate – Transfer	
	Tollbooth Fee: See link for further details	
Investment Objective	To ensure traffic in the rainy season and to improve mining conditions, traffic congestion on Highway 1, serving socio-economic development, security and defense sector in general and Thua Thien Hue province said separately, in accordance with the planning and development orientation of Transportation	
Commencement Date	22/08/2013	
Completion Date	31/12/2015	
Duration of Operation	22 years and 7 months	After Finalisation:

## **MARD**

### **11. Renovation and upgrading of the Vocational College of Mechanization and Irrigation in Dong Nai Province**

<http://mic.mard.gov.vn/Project/2652.aspx> (M&E docs available via the link)

#### Thông tin dự án

Tên dự án	Cải tạo, nâng cấp Trường Cao đẳng nghề Cơ giới và Thủy lợi
Mã dự án	7543062
Đơn vị báo cáo	Trường Cao đẳng nghề cơ giới và Thủy lợi
Địa điểm thực hiện	Đồng Nai
Quyết định phê duyệt	4391
Ngày phê duyệt	30/10/2015
Giai đoạn thực hiện	2016 - 2020
Tổng vốn đầu tư	65000 triệu đồng
Trạng thái	Đang thực hiện
Người báo cáo	Trần Thị Hạnh



## HỆ THỐNG QUẢN LÝ CÁC DỰ ÁN ĐẦU TƯ THUỘC BỘ NÔNG NGHIỆP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN NÔNG THÔN

- Home page
- Introduce
- View project
- Extract reports
- DA has not reported
- Guide


### Project information

Name of project	Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation
Project code	7543062
Reporting Entity	College mechanization and irrigation
Performance venues	Dong Nai
Approval decision	4391
Date of approval	30/10/2015
The implementation phase	2016 - 2020
total investment	65000 million
Status	Processing
Annunciator	Tran Thi Hanh

- Project Description
- year delivery plan
- monthly Implementation
- Monitoring and Evaluation

Year implemented 2016

### Tình hình thực hiện các dự án đầu tư của Bộ năm 2016



Name of project	Monthly report	Implemented capital (million)	Disbursements (million)	Attachments
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	01/2016	0	0	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	02/2016	0	0	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	03/2016	0	0	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	04/2016	0	0	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	05/2016	507	507	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	06/2016	186	186	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	07/2016	189	189	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	08/2016	824	824	
Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation	09/2016	7517	7517	
<b>Total:</b>		<b>9223</b>	<b>9223</b>	

### Project information

Name of project Renovate and upgrade the College Mechanization and Irrigation

Project code	7543062
Reporting Entity	Vocational College of Mechanization and Irrigation in Dong Nai Province
Performance venues	Dong Nai
Approval decision	4391
Date of approval	30/10/2015
The implementation phase	2016 - 2020
Total investment	65000 million
Status	Processing
Contact for Updates	Tran Thi Hanh

## **12. Irrigation in Ha Tinh Province**

<http://mic.mard.gov.vn/Project/2842.aspx> (No details available as project is yet to commence)

### Thông tin dự án

Tên dự án	Dự án WB.8 Thủy lợi (Hà Tĩnh)
Mã dự án	
Đơn vị báo cáo	Ban QLDA WB.8 Thủy lợi Hà Tĩnh
Địa điểm thực hiện	Hà Tĩnh
Quyết định phê duyệt	4638
Ngày phê duyệt	09/11/2015
Giai đoạn thực hiện	2016 - 2022
Tổng vốn đầu tư	0 triệu đồng
Trạng thái	Dự án mới, chưa phải báo cáo cho đến khi khởi công
Người báo cáo	

### Project information

Name of project	WB.8 Irrigation Project (Ha Tinh)
Project code	
Reporting Entity	Irrigation PMU WB.8 Ha Tinh
Performance venues	Ha Tinh
Approval decision	4638
Date of approval	11/09/2015
The implementation phase	2016 - 2022
Total investment	0 million
Status	The new project, not to report until commencement
Contact for Updates	

## **13. Renovation and upgrading of the Vegetables Research Institute in Hanoi**

<http://mic.mard.gov.vn/Project/2742.aspx> (No details available as project is yet to commence)

### Thông tin dự án

Tên dự án	Cải tạo, nâng cấp Viện nghiên cứu Rau quả
Mã dự án	
Đơn vị báo cáo	Viện nghiên cứu rau quả
Địa điểm thực hiện	Hà Nội

Quyết định phê duyệt	0
Ngày phê duyệt	01/01/1980
Giai đoạn thực hiện	2015 - 2016
Tổng vốn đầu tư	0 triệu đồng
Trạng thái	Dự án mới, chưa phải báo cáo cho đến khi khởi công
Người báo cáo	Hoàng Thị Tuyết Nhung

#### Project information

Name of project	Renovate and upgrade Vegetables Research Institute
Project code	
Reporting Entity	Vegetable Research Institute
Performance venues	Hanoi
Approval decision	0
Date of approval	01/01/1980
The implementation phase	2015 - 2016
Total investment	0 million
Status	The new project, not to report until commencement
Contact for Updates	Hoang Thi Tuyet Nhung


#### **14. IPM [undefined] in Bac Lieu Province**

<http://mic.mard.gov.vn/Project/2610.aspx> (No details available despite funding being received and disbursed by the PE)

#### Thông tin dự án

Tên dự án	Dự án WB.6 (IPM Bạc Liêu)
Mã dự án	
Đơn vị báo cáo	Sở Nông nghiệp và PTNT Bạc Liêu
Địa điểm thực hiện	Bạc Liêu
Quyết định phê duyệt	1214/QĐ-BNN-XD
Ngày phê duyệt	24/05/2012
Giai đoạn thực hiện	2013 - 2016
Tổng vốn đầu tư	0 triệu đồng
Trạng thái	Đang thực hiện
Người báo cáo	Lương Thị Hồng Cẩm

Hello: Guest | [Login](#) |



## HỆ THỐNG QUẢN LÝ CÁC DỰ ÁN ĐẦU TƯ THUỘC BỘ NÔNG NGHIỆP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN NÔNG THÔN

[Home page](#) | [Introduce](#) | [View project](#) | [Extract reports](#) | [DA has not reported](#) | [Guide](#)

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
**Project information**

Name of project	Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)
Project code	
Reporting Entity	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development of Bac Lieu
Performance venues	Bac Lieu
Approval decision	1214 / QD-BNN-XD
Date of approval	24/05/2012
The implementation phase	2013 - 2016
total investment	0 million
Status	Processing
Annunciator	Luong Thi Hong Cam

Project Description | **year delivery plan** | monthly Implementation | Monitoring and Evaluation

Year implemented: 2016

**Tình hình thực hiện các dự án đầu tư của Bộ năm 2016**



	01/2016	02/2016	03/2016	04/2016	05/2016	06/2016	07/2016	08/2016	09/2016
<b>Thực hiện</b>	0	0	350	350	350	350	1550	1550	1550
<b>Giải ngân</b>	0	0	350	350	350	350	1550	1550	1550

Name of project	Monthly report	Implemented capital (million)	Disbursements (million)	Attachments
Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)	01/2016	0	0	
Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)	02/2016	0	0	
Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)	03/2016	350	350	
Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)	04/2016	0	0	
Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)	05/2016	0	0	
Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)	06/2016	0	0	
Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)	07/2016	1200	1200	
Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)	08/2016	0	0	
Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)	09/2016	0	0	
<b>Total:</b>		<b>1550</b>	<b>1550</b>	

**Project information**

Name of project	Project WB.6 (IPM Bac Lieu)
Project code	
Reporting Entity	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development of Bac Lieu
Performance venues	Bac Lieu
Approval decision	1214 / QD-BNN-XD
Date of approval	24/05/2012
The implementation phase	2013 - 2016

Total investment	0 million
Status	Processing
Contact for Updates	Luong Thi Hong Cam

### 15. Regular repair of dykes in Ninh Binh

<http://mic.mard.gov.vn/Project/914.aspx> (No M&E reports available despite funding being received and disbursed by the PE)

#### Thông tin dự án

Tên dự án	Tu bổ đề điều thường xuyên năm 2010 Ninh Bình
Mã dự án	7011362
Đơn vị báo cáo	Ban QLDA chống lụt bão và đề điều Ninh Bình
Địa điểm thực hiện	Ninh Bình
Quyết định phê duyệt	2941/QĐ-BNN-ĐĐ
Ngày phê duyệt	19/10/2009
Giai đoạn thực hiện	2010 - 2010
Tổng vốn đầu tư	6000 triệu đồng
Trạng thái	Đã kết thúc và quyết toán xong
Người báo cáo	Lê Thị Kim Dung


Translate From: Vietnamese To: English

View: Translation Original

The screenshot shows a web interface for a project management system. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the text 'HỆ THỐNG QUẢN LÝ CÁC DỰ ÁN ĐẦU TƯ THUỘC BỘ NÔNG NGHIỆP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN NÔNG THÔN'. Below this, there is a menu with options: 'Home page', 'Introduce', 'View project', 'Extract reports', 'DA has not reported', and 'Guide'. The main content area is titled 'Project information' and contains a table with the following data:

Name of project	Regular repair of dykes in 2010 Ninh Binh
Project code	7011362
Reporting Entity	PMB flood control dykes and Ninh Binh
Performance venues	Ninh Binh
Approval decision	2941 / QĐ-BNN-DD
Date of approval	19/10/2009
The implementation phase	2010 - 2010
total investment	6000 million
Status	Ended and complete settlement
Annunciator	Le Thi Kim Dung





## Project information

Name of project	Regular repair of dykes in 2010 Ninh Binh
Project code	7011362
Reporting Entity	Ninh Binh Flood control dykes Project Management Unit
Performance venues	Ninh Binh
Approval decision	2941 / QD-BNN-DD
Date of approval	19/10/2009
The implementation phase	2010 - 2010
total investment	6000 million
Status	Ended and complete settlement
Annunciator	Le Thi Kim Dung

## MOH

### **16. Gastrointestinal Hospital Centre E**

STT	Tên dự án	Thời gian bắt đầu	Thời gian kết thúc	Nguồn vốn	Loại tài trợ	Kinh phí dự án
6	Trung tâm tiêu hóa bệnh viện E	11/01/2012	01/12/2015	-	-	-

No.	Project Name	Start Date	End Date	Source of Capital	Type of Financing	Project Funding
6	Gastrointestinal Hospital Centre E	11/01/2012	01/12/2015	-	-	-

### **17. Provision of Medical Equipment for Tai Mũi Hong TW Hospital**

STT	Tên dự án	Thời gian bắt đầu	Thời gian kết thúc	Nguồn vốn	Loại tài trợ	Kinh phí dự án
18	Cung cấp Trang thiết bị y tế cho Bệnh viện Tai Mũi Họng TW	01/01/2012	01/12/2014	CP Hàn Quốc	Vay	US\$20,532,017

No.	Project Name	Start Date	End Date	Source of Capital	Type of Financing	Project Funding
18	Provision of Medical Equipment for Tai Mũi Họng TW Hospital	01/01/2012	01/12/2014	CP Korea	Loan	US\$20,532,017

## **MOC**

### **18. Additional capital construction projects the city drainage system in Bac Ninh**

<http://www.moc.gov.vn/en/web/guest/56/-/tin-chi-tiet/1Lu9/28114/143830/bo-sung-von-du-an-xay-dung-he-thong-thoat-nuoc-thanh-pho-bac-ninh.html>

Bổ sung vốn dự án xây dựng hệ thống thoát nước thành phố Bắc Ninh  
1/14/12 7:33 AM

Thủ tướng Chính phủ vừa [phê duyệt](#) bổ sung 1.650.000 Euro vốn ODA của Chính phủ Cộng hòa Liên bang Đức cho dự án "Đầu tư xây dựng hệ thống thoát nước và xử lý nước thải thành phố Bắc Ninh".

Thủ tướng Chính phủ giao Bộ Tài chính điều chỉnh Hiệp định vay vốn dự án trên theo quy định.

UBND tỉnh Bắc Ninh chỉ đạo việc triển khai thực hiện dự án, tránh kéo dài, tăng chi phí.

Được biết, Dự án đầu tư xây dựng hệ thống thoát nước và xử lý nước thải thành phố Bắc Ninh là dự án xử lý nước thải đô thị lớn đầu tiên trên địa bàn tỉnh Bắc Ninh, do Công ty TNHH một thành viên cấp thoát nước Bắc Ninh làm chủ đầu tư, có công suất xử lý 12.000 m<sup>3</sup>/ngày đêm.

Dự án sẽ xây dựng mới và cải tạo 24,5 km đường ống, cống thoát nước có kích thước đường kính ống cống từ 0,2 m đến 3,2 m để thu gom và chuyển tải nước mưa, nước thải nhằm giải quyết triệt để tình trạng ngập úng cục bộ trên địa bàn thành phố, xử lý giảm thiểu việc ô nhiễm do nước thải gây ra cho các nguồn nước, bảo đảm nước thải được xử lý đạt tiêu chuẩn vệ sinh môi trường trước khi thoát vào hệ thống thoát nước chung.

Additional capital for the construction of city drainage system projects in Bac Ninh  
1/14/12 7:33 AM

The Prime Minister has [approved](#) additional ODA Euro 1,650,000 Government Federal Republic of Germany for the project "Investment in construction of sewerage systems and wastewater treatment Bac Ninh city".

Prime Minister assigned the Ministry of Finance to adjust the project loan agreement in accordance with regulations.

Bac Ninh provincial People's Committee to direct the project implementation, to avoid prolonged, increasing costs.

Reportedly, the investment project to build sewerage systems and wastewater treatment Bac Ninh city project is urban wastewater treatment first major Bac Ninh province, by a Member Company Limited supply Bac Ninh water as an investor, has a processing capacity of 12,000 m<sup>3</sup> / day.

The project will build 24.5 kilometers of new and renovated pipe, sewer pipe diameter sizes from 0.2 m to 3.2 drains meters to collect and convey stormwater and wastewater to settle fully localized inundation in the city, handling minimize pollution caused by sewage water sources, ensuring wastewater treatment to meet sanitation standards before being released into the system combined sewer.

By: [www.chinhphu.vn](http://www.chinhphu.vn)

### **19. Arranging counterpart funding for small and medium ADB-funded urban development projects in Central Vietnam**

<http://www.moc.gov.vn/en/web/guest/56/-/tin-chi-tiet/1Lu9/28114/142910/bo-tri-von-doi-ung-cho-du-an-phat-trien-do-thi-vua-va-nho-mien-trung-do-ADB-tai-tro.html>

Bố trí vốn đối ứng cho dự án phát triển đô thị vừa và nhỏ miền Trung do ADB tài trợ  
1/5/12 3:07 PM

Ngày 30/12, Bộ Xây dựng đã có công văn 2302/BXD-HTKT gửi Ủy ban Nhân dân các tỉnh: Phú Yên, Khánh Hòa, Ninh Thuận, Bình Thuận, Đắk Nông về việc bố trí vốn đối ứng cho dự án phát triển đô thị vừa và nhỏ miền Trung do ADB tài trợ.

Dự án phát triển đô thị vừa và nhỏ miền Trung do Ngân hàng Phát triển Châu Á tài trợ (khoản vay ADB số 2272-VIE(SF)) đang được triển khai thực hiện tại 5 tỉnh: Phú Yên, Khánh Hòa, Ninh Thuận, Bình Thuận và Đắk Nông. Đến nay, công tác đấu thầu các gói thầu xây lắp của dự án đã hoàn thành. Ban quản lý dự án các tỉnh đã ký kết hợp đồng và đang tổ chức thực hiện hợp đồng. Theo dự kiến, các hợp đồng này sẽ được thực hiện trong thời gian tối đa là 24 tháng để đảm bảo đáp ứng thời hạn hoàn thành dự án vào ngày 31/12/2013.

Do dự án này đã được ADB gia hạn một lần và sẽ không được gia hạn thêm nên Phái đoàn xem xét vốn vay của ADB trong chuyến công tác từ ngày 5-7/10/2011 đã yêu cầu các tỉnh cần nỗ lực đẩy nhanh tiến độ thi công các hợp đồng xây lắp để có thể hoàn thành chậm nhất vào ngày 31/12/2013. Theo quy định của Hiệp định dự án, các hợp đồng xây lắp của dự án sẽ được chi trả đồng thời từ 2 nguồn: nguồn vốn ADB và vốn đối ứng. ADB sẽ chỉ giải ngân nguồn vốn tài trợ khi nguồn vốn đối ứng của các hợp đồng được giải ngân tương ứng.

Vì vậy, việc bố trí đủ và kịp thời nguồn vốn đối ứng của các tỉnh trong quá trình thực hiện dự án là yếu tố quan trọng để các hợp đồng có thể hoàn thành theo đúng thời hạn đã cam kết.

Trung tâm Thông tin

Nguồn: *Công văn 2302/BXD-HTKT*.

Tài liệu đính kèm bài viết	
(Cong van 2302.doc)	<a href="#">Tải về</a>

Arranging counterpart funding for small and medium ADB-funded urban development projects in Central Vietnam

1/5/12 3:07 PM

30/12 days, the Ministry of Construction has written 2302 / BXD-TC sent the provincial People's Committee of Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Dak Nong on the arrangement of reciprocal capital for development projects medium and small urban development in Central ADB funded.

Urban development projects of small and medium due Central Asian Development Bank funded (ADB loans No. 2272-VIE (SF)) is being implemented in five provinces of Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan and Dak Nong. To date, the bidding for the construction package of the project has been completed. Project Management Unit of the provinces have signed a contract and are implementing the contract. As expected, these contracts will be carried out in a maximum period of 24 months to ensure it meets deadlines to complete the project on 31/12/2013.

Because this project is ADB extended once and will not be extended to the Mission of ADB loans reviewed on a business trip on 5-7 / 10/2011 has asked the provinces to accelerate efforts construction progress of the construction contract to be completed no later than 31/12/2013. Under the provisions of the Agreement on the project, the construction contract of the project will be paid simultaneously from two sources: ADB funds and counterpart funds. ADB will disburse funding as counterpart funds are disbursed contracts respectively. Therefore, the arrangement of adequate and timely counterpart funds of the provinces in the project implementation process is critical to the deal can be completed on time commitments.

Information Centre

Source: *Official Letter 2302 / BXD-TC*.

Attachments Articles	
(Cong van 2302.doc)	<a href="#">Download</a>

Hanoi DOET

## **20. Evaluating the design, construction project cost estimates Tran Nhan Tong High School**

<http://hanoi.edu.vn/tin-hoat-dong/tham-dinh-thiet-ke-du-toan-du-an-xay-dung-truong-thpt-tran-nhan-tong-c1011-2372.aspx>

Thẩm định thiết kế, dự toán dự án xây dựng trường THPT Trần Nhân Tông  
Cập nhật : 8:42 20/8/2015  
Lượt xem : 1242

Sở Xây dựng Hà Nội đã ký văn bản số 3414/SXD-TĐ chấp thuận kết quả thẩm định thiết kế bản vẽ thi công và dự toán công trình xây dựng, cải tạo trường THPT Trần Nhân Tông tại số 15 phố Hương Viên, phường Đồng Nhân, quận Hai Bà Trưng, gồm các hạng mục chủ yếu sau:

- Phá dỡ nhà học, nhà hiệu bộ cũ đã xuống cấp, xây dựng nhà học và hiệu bộ cao 6 tầng + 01 tầng áp mái.
- Xây dựng hạ tầng kỹ thuật: Sân vườn, tường rào, nhà bảo vệ, trạm bơm, PCCC, cải tạo nhà học 4 tầng còn lại, bổ sung trang thiết bị.

Trên cơ sở văn bản thẩm định của Sở Xây dựng, Sở Giáo dục và Đào tạo đã hoàn tất hồ sơ trình UBND Thành phố phê duyệt thiết kế bản vẽ thi công và dự toán cho dự án, tạo điều kiện giúp trường hoàn thành thủ tục ghi vốn và triển khai thi công vào năm 2016.

Tác giả: Ban QLDA

Evaluating the design, construction project cost estimates Tran Nhan Tong High School  
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Hanoi Department of Construction signed document No. 3414 / SXD-TD approval evaluation results construction drawing design and construction cost estimates, renovated high school at 15 Tran Nhan Tong Street Vien Huong ward Tongren, Hai Ba Trung district, including the following major categories:

- Demolition School, former home of degraded performance, building the school and high efficiency 6 + 01 attic floor.
- Infrastructure Construction: Garden, fences, home protection, pumping stations, fire protection, 4-storey house renovation remaining study, additional equipment.

On the basis of the written approval of the Department of Construction, Department of Education and Training have completed the dossiers submitted for the Municipal People's Committee to approve construction drawing designs and cost estimates for the project, facilitating clearance school registration process and deployment of capital construction in 2016.

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